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Militarisation, the arms trade, military government and the 
course of wars in sub-Saharan Africa have been described and 
analysed. With few exceptions the political and human 
economic costs of war have not. This is so despite the fact 
that these costs have exceeded those of drought and are 
clearly a major (and negative) contextual fact even in respect 
to non-militarised and pacifically inclined states like 
Tanzania. They dominate the human and economic context of 
Mozambique and Angola in particular, and to a slightly lesser 
degree of Southern Africa more generally. This paper explores 
the types of wars and of costs with a section devoted to cost 
estimation for Tanzania.
Author Note
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international organisations. This paper flows in large part 
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to Stephen Lewis, Chris Smith, Charles Harvey and Ann Segrave 
whose comments and suggestions on an earlier draft have led to 
improvements in the analysis and - hopefully! - the clarity of 
the present text. A related publication is Children on the 
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KILLING THE DREAM: THE POLITICAL AND HUMAN ECONOMY OF WAR IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Reginald Herbold Green
This is terrorism but it is
not mindless. They [South Africa]
seek to kill the dream.
- Joseph Hanlon, 1987
To fight the military and the 
economic fronts of the war 
separately will assuredly result 
in losing both.
- David Martin, 1986
WHAT TERRAIN?
This is not a paper about military governments, militarisation 
as usually defined or studied, the arms trade or general 
expenditure on domestic security/repression. Those are 
doubtless related topics but not the present focus.
Nor is it a paper deeply analysing military elements of war - 
let alone military strategy and tactics as such, except in 
passing as they relate to costs. Again these are related 
topics but require a separate paper and also a different
author .
Clearly the economic costs of war are one aspect of 
militarisation. Similarly the greater influence of military 
leaders during a war may have a permanent effect on post-war 
resource allocation, choices of military strategy and 
technology and costs. Nor are human and economic costs truly 
separable from social disintegration, psychological impact and 
related topics. The geo-polities of Africa are not
hermetically sealed off from the rest of the world. Vide, 
e.g., the USA's apparent belief that Cuba is both a great 
power and a pure proxy for the USSR at the same time and its 
resultant - to a degree self-validating - perception of Angola 
as an East-West battlefield (with African, South African and 
Angolan contextual elements secondary or irrelevant). 
External arms supplies and suppliers may create or escalate as
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well as react to and supply war and militarisation. The 
* reasons for not pursuing these issues are three - space and 
» time do not permit? the intended area of contribution of this 
study is to macro and sectoral economic analysis and policy; 
the author is not an expert on general militarisation issues 
(or literature) nor adequately grounded in sociology and 
psychology to attempt such an exercise.
Rather the focus is on the national (macro and sectoral) and 
human political economic costs and consequences of war in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) . War for these purposes is defined 
to include: external wars including proxy wars, precautionary 
armed forces to deter or be able to fight such wars above 
'normal' security spending, military solidarity with 
threatened friendly neighbours and civil war including high 
and sustained levels of banditry beyond those with which a 
normal police force can deal. The costs, it should be 
stressed, are not seen as solely - nor even primarily - lives 
lost and assets destroyed in fighting, nor the fiscal and GDP 
burden limited to direct military expenditure during the 
period of the war. Clearly both the definition of war and of 
costs are less than precise, and at the margin some situations 
are debatable as to categorisation. Perhaps there is an 
analogy to be drawn with African fauna: on a quick sighting a 
wildebeest (gnu) may be mistaken for a buffalo (but not a 
Thompson's gazelle or a zebra) but a giraffe is readily 
identified (except for distant sightings with its head - and 
neck - down to graze) even if verbal descriptions seem rather 
inexact.
The reconnaisance technique used involves two parts - a 
general exploration with an illustrative case in this paper, 
and a fuller examination of the Southern African war of 
defence against the regional hegemonic aspects of the Republic 
of South Africa's 'total strategy' in a related second paper, 
'Cutting Off The Flowers'. In the first part a brief survey 
of what has and has not been studied is followed by an aside 
on military governments and war before a taxonomy of types of 
war (as defined here). A review of types of costs precedes a 
brief Tanzanian illustration of the general review and a 
summary of the political economic implications - macro and 
human.
The balance of this chapter reviews the present lack of 
knowledge; the interlocking impact of drought and war leading 
to starvation (as opposed to serious malnutrition without 
starvation when war is subtracted); the special sub-regional 
case of war in Southern Africa. The second chapter seeks to 
develop a taxonomy of types of war in SSA with brief concrete 
examples, while the third makes a similar attempt toward a 
systematic approach to identifying macroeconomic and human 
costs of war. In the fourth chapter these approaches are 
applied to Tanzania as a case study. The fifth chapter seeks 
to demonstrate that because the macroeconomic costs of war are 
often large relative to exogenous shocks or economic policy
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results, it is important to estimate them and to incorporate 
them into macroeconomic analysis and programming. Because of 
their scale and resource allocation implications, not to do so 
is at least as logically unsound as to overlook past and 
probable future terms of trade evolution or to pay no 
attention to the price of foreign exchange (i.e. exchange rate 
policy).
It may reasonably be asked why so few statistics are used and 
in particular no continental comparative military expenditure 
and war cost tables. Comparative data on military expenditure 
are readily available (in the World Development Report tabular 
annex) but are - at least in all cases the author knows in any 
detail - incomplete and inaccuracte to various extents. Their 
inaccurate raw values may well be misleading while correction 
for 46 countries would require several years and researchers. 
Military import data are even less available - specialised 
equipment and armaments are normally excluded and other items 
for the military lumped with civil use imports. For the other 
war costs, as analysed in the third chapter neither data nor 
rough estimates exist for a majority of SSA states.
Terra Incognita: Here Be Dragons
The political and human economy of war as defined - generally, 
but especially in respect to sub-Saharan Africa - is marked by 
vast voids and occasional signposts or half completed 
structures so far as analytical literature is concerned. One 
is forcibly reminded of medieval maps which, having nailed 
down a few known points and sketched some roughly known 
coasts, islands, rivers and mountains with varying degrees of 
scale and proportion errors, then filled in the pervasive 
blanks, with wierd and wonderful creatures and captions such 
as 'here be dragons'. This is no more to denigrate present 
writers - especially those on related topics - than medieval 
map draftsmen, who did lay the foundations and identify some 
of the basic coordinates for the evolution of modern 
cartography.
There is of course a substantial body of Anglo-American 
literature on wartime economic management and on economic 
aspects of military strategies (e.g. strategic and saturation 
bombing) . These are relevant to estimating the short term 
potential for and costs of resource reallocation to replace 
specific or local damage, but less so to projecting medium 
term macroeconomic costs or how to contain them. However, it 
is less than directly relevant, not simply because SSA 
economies are not structurally similar to the USA and UK but 
because the USA (virtually wholly) and the UK (predominantly) 
fought the Second World War abroad, not at home. For that 
reason parallel French World War I or Soviet and German World 
War II literature - which presumably exists but is not widely 
known - would perhaps have a greater degree of relevance.
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There is a body of writing on military regimes and militarism 
m in SSA. Some of it is socio or political economic but its 
analysis is largely in terms of class and of governmental 
structure analysis, not of political economic or 
systematically - human costs and consequences of war. Further 
- as the next section outlines - there is not, at least in a 
majority of SSA cases, any close causal link between military 
government and war in either direction.
Overall, writing on militarism and the international arms 
trade does allude to SSa , though Africa is not oy any means 
central to that body of work. Here the problem tends to be 
twofold. War and arms purchases seem more causally correlated 
than arms purchases and war. Africa is not characterised by 
large, well trained, well equipped forces with no actual or 
prospective wars but by arms purchases related to past, 
present or impending wars. Similarly, foreign military links 
appear to have sprung out of actual or perceived threats of 
war - not to have caused them.
The most probable exception is Angola, where in the absence of 
initial South African/CIA intervention, the Angolan government 
would not have called on Cuban combat forces, and the 
escalation of a civil war to a regional conflict involving 
major powers (at one remove) - would have been averted. 
Almost certainly the civil war would have ended in a complete 
government (MPLA) victory militarily, and probably a 
substantial degree of mass level reconciliation, with the 
possible exception of the Ovimbundu Plateau where a genuine, 
deep regional distrust of all central authority (not just 
Portuguese) gave UNITA a certain degree of popular support. 
In any event this literature - which usually treats SSA as a 
minor theatre - appears to mix up directions of causation, to 
overstate extra-African factors (or at least to understate 
African) and to pay little attention to war or macroeconomics 
as such.
Disasters caused by war have been covered, usually 
journalistically. However, the breadth and especially depth 
of the coverage is usually limited. For example, it has 
rarely been underlined that drought alone did not lead to mass 
starvation in SSA in the 1980s, even in the context of weak 
governmental structures and shaky economies. On these counts 
Mali would have had as brutal a human toll as the Sudan, Chad 
or Ethiopia. Indeed neither have substantial war costs led to 
starvation when there was not widespread fighting (or post war 
banditry) in the country. Tanzania has not had famine deaths.
Drought Plus War Equals Starvation
Drought and war - or even war alone - have resulted in 
starvation. In both Ethiopia and the Sudan, war has both 
directly and by the diversion of limited resources led to 
famine deaths. In Angola and Mozambique famine has become
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endemic - even in good weather years - because of widespread 
wars fought on their territories which prevent food 
production, storage and transport. In 1979-80 Uganda district 
level starvation resulted from post war banditry and lack of 
governmental authority, making food distribution impossible. 
Except in the totally war dislocated West Nile, it has been 
very rare since because Uganda has few high drought risk 
areas. In the case of Nigeria (Biafra) war was the sole cause 
of famine. Dislocation of production and blockade of the 
secessionist entity were its causes, not general national 
absence of food, transport or potential external supplies.
There are some apparent exceptions to this pattern. However, 
of the two most prominent ones, Somalia is basically a war
spillover case, with a massive inflow of starving victims from 
war in Ethiopia. The one clearly valid exception, Ethiopia
itself, did in the early 1970s have massive famine without a 
major war (the then low grade war in Eritrea is not causally 
linked to Tigrean famine) . In that case famine - and a 
peculiarly inept and callous governmental failure to act to 
overcome it - in part caused and in part was the occasion for
the revolution, and thus indirectly for the subsequent
intensifying of armed conflict with Somalia, with/in Eritrea 
and in Tigre.
Another largely war caused disaster not usually examined from 
that perspective is the economic collapse and resultant
magendo economic system in Uganda. Certainly parallel
markets, even on a grand scale, are not unusual in SSA but
Uganda magendo as a dominant economic system was, and to a 
substantial extent still is, unusual. It clearly resulted 
from the 1978-79 war. Before then the Uganda economy 
(bolstered by the 1976-77 beverage boom) was not in a state of 
total collapse, much of the 'parallel market1 structure was 
either state 'licensed' (as in neighbouring Zaire) or to some 
degree state contained and semi-controlled. There was a 
substantial, visible 'open' economy. After the war with no 
effective government (lacking both material resources, 
legitimacy and priorities beyond survival in purely political 
power terms) the parallel economy became dominant as discussed 
more fully in 'Magendo in the Political Economy of Uganda:
Pathology, parallel system or dominant sub-mode of 
production?'(R. H. Green, IDS Discussion Paper 164). In that 
period (and to a lesser extent still) it was characterised by 
an oligopolistic structure based on economic power, transport 
and guns. It remained so until the second Obote regime's
1981-84 stabilisation programme which - whatever else it did - 
began to restore the legal or open economy to a status 
comparable to the parallel economy. That exercise perished in 
mounting civil war and, with continued banditry or civil war 
threats, the government of President Museveni has had neither 
its own resources, the ability to raise external resources, 
the time to define a coherent economic strategy nor the 
ability to reduce military (war) spending's near absolute 
prior i ty.
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ioutnern Africa At War
Recently Southern Africa's war has teen analysed with a 
greater attention to macro-economic and human aspects. 
Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War (D. Martin and 
P. Johnson), Beggar Your Neighbours (J. Hanlon) and Children 
wn The Front Line (R. Green, D. Esrat, M. Mauras and R. Morgan 
for UNICEF) are the most recent and notable but not the only 
examples.
These studies seek to provide systematic estimates of the 
overall economic and - especially" in the UNICEF case - human 
costs of war, as defined above. However, these parts of the 
volumes - with the partial exception of UNICEF - tend to be 
largely free-standing and not integrally related to the 
dynamics of the war. Nor are the questions of joint 
strategies on the war and economic fronts pursued.
Perhaps the fullest coverage is in the forthcoming zimbabwe1s 
Prospects volume edited by Colin Stoneman (Macmillan, 
Basingstoke and Harare, 1988). There are specific chapters on 
destabilisation and the military threat from South Africa and, 
as well as passing references in several economic chapters, an 
attempt to recast overall and, to a limited extent sectoral 
economic projections for heightened hostilities as a 
contingency. Even here the military chapter (basically 
strategy and tactics) and the (basically economic) 
destabilisation one do not interact, most of the sectoral 
references are very superficial and the projection rerun is 
little more than an export loss vector analogue. Progress, 
yes; seriously integrated analysis, no.
Similarly, the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC) programme of action was designed to reduce 
dependence, especially on South Africa, in the context of 
peace (or at worst armed hostility with limited military 
clashes) . In 1979-80 that did appear to be a reasonable 
assumption. Since 1981 and - especially - 1983- it has clearly 
no longer remained so. However, one would not readily grasp 
that massive contextual change from reading successive SADCC 
sectoral and project papers - as opposed to overview 
references to the costs of South African aggression, including 
a 1985 paper to the OAU setting them out systematically for 
the first time.
It is true that the projects given higher priority, e.g. Beira 
and Dar es Salaam transport corridors, do appear particularly 
critical in a war context. But the nature of the re-ordering 
of project priorities for this reason - perhaps wisely 
remain^, almost totally implicit. Similarly, it is less than 
clear that SADCC (perhaps reasonably enough as a sectoral 
economic coordination body) or the Front Line States (jointly 
or severally) have done systematic thinking on the 
war/macroeconomic front interactions. Zimbabwe's solidarity
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force in Mozambique is clearly in part related to Zimbabwe's 
economic need for access to nearby, non-RSA port facilities, 
but the degree of underutilisation of the protected rail, road 
and dry cargo harbour facilities (the petroleum harbour and 
pipeline facilities are fairly fully used) suggests less than 
full coordination even there.
Clearly no sane government can be expected to lay all aspects 
of linked military/economic strategy and - especially - 
tactics out for public (including enemy) inspection. But to 
achieve a strategy at all, much less articulated policies and 
implementation, requires both political and technical 
discussion involving numbers of people well beyond the maximum 
consistent with total secrecy.
Similar considerations may constrain some of the potentially 
best informed observers. Exposing proposed or actual 
strategies and tactics of Southern African states to South 
African eyes prematurely is something the present author, 
among others, certainly leans over backward to avoid. But 
this reticence can be overdone - South Africa has an
information and analysis system of its own and lack of
analysis leading to lack of coherent action can be more 
expensive to Southern African states than having such analysis 
and action known in broad terms to South Africa.
World Bank, UN, ECA and IMF studies on economic crises and
means to stabilisation, adjustment and recovery rarely list 
war as a substantial cause of the problems (except in the 
cases of Mozambique overtly and the Sudan, Ethiopia and Chad 
more obliquely). Certainly their analysis and proposals do 
not pay any integral attention to war costs or to the economic 
implications of attempting economic restructuring during a
war .
Arguably there may be no major stabilisation or structural 
adjustment differences from other exogenous factors such as 
terms of trade deterioration or drought if war costs are 
dominantly deterrent/preventative and solidarity forces are 
abroad, e.g. Tanzania, Zimbabwe. However, that approach would 
appear to require justification in each case. At the very 
least the probable future levels of war costs need to be 
projected with as much care as other major demands on 
re sou rce s . It is far from evident that this is being done.
In the case of economies torn to shreds by war - e.g. 
Mozambiaue - or locked into long term, extremely costly 
domestic wars even if these do not paralyse the core of the 
economy ~ e.g. Ethiopia, Sudan — the initial assumption would 
logically seem to be that these must integrally affect 
economic strategy, structure, policy and programme. For 
example, Mozambique's bottom line external balance problems 
relate to 80 per cent of visible and invisible exports being 
lost because of war and to over 40 per cent of government 
spending eaten up by the defence effort. In that context
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♦devaluation and price adjustments more generally may well have 
~ «roles to play. But devaluation can hardly be expected to do 
much to reduce external balance, nor price adjustments to 
restore a fiscal position which would be minimally 
satisfactory in a peacetime context. Yet, on the face of it, 
the Bank and Fund structural adjustment and stabilisation 
proposals to Mozambique seem very much 'business as usual1, 
abstracting from the war except in the limited sense that some 
rehabilitation projects relate to war damage and balance of 
payments support replaces lost exports.
This survey suggests that there is a gap relating both to the 
macroeconomic and human costs of war in SSA and to the 
interaction of economic and military strategy and policy in 
the context of war. Before attempting a taxonomy of costs, it 
may be useful to examine briefly the inter-relationships - or 
lack, of them - between military government and war in SSA.
War and Military Governments: An Aside
There is no one to one correlation between war and military 
governments in either direction. There may be a correlation 
between war and resultant military governments but, if so, not 
a very strong one. Similarly, military regimes may be more 
likely to seek to resolve conflicts by force, but this again 
seems to be a weak correlation.
Military or quasi-military governments in SSA are common. 
They are also very diverse. Examining them in detail in 
relation to war and/or military expenditure alone would 
require an entire paper or an aside so lengthy as to distract 
from the main themes of this one. A few additional comments 
appear as an Annex.
II
WAR IN SSA: PROLEGEMENON TO A TAXONOMY
The taxonomy of SSA war which follows is organised on the 
basis of macro and human economic impact and of cost patterns, 
rather than of detailed causation and evaluation of issues of 
right and wrong. The three broad classes identified are i) 
ant i-colonlal wars of independence; ii) civil (domestic) wars 
and/or conditions of endemic high levels of armed disorder; 
iii) external wars.
The two present cases of wars for independence against a 
colonial/occupying power are Namibia and the Sahara Democratic 
Republic. The four previous SSA cases are Angola, Mozambique, 
Guinea de Sao and Zimbabwe. An argument could be made out 
that Kenya (Mau Mau) should be included.
The macroeconomic impact is primarily on the colonial eco y 
- the liberation forces rarely have firm enough possessi n 
civil governmental apparatus to achieve more than oca 
skeletal medium distance trade structures. The impac 
varied. In Guinea de Sao the war destroyed the a w y 
rather minimal - Portuguese colonial economy and ma e 
colony a heavy fiscal drag on the metropolitan treasury. 
Angola agricultural output (especially coffee in the nor 
and to a lesser extent mining were severely affected, 
opening-up boom was slowed as was the proving and deve °Pm0 
of the petrolero sector, except for the Cabinda enclave 10 
whose location allowed their insulation from the w . 
Militarily, Angola became a budgetary burden, while on 
enterprise side it remained profitable, with the new petro eu 
growth pole and much of the rest of the economy in goo 
working order.
Mozambique was an intermediate case. Its opening up boom was 
halted and in the 1970s reversed with Gross Territoria 
Product declining. While most of the settler and estate 
agriculture, the transit traffic routes and the new S°u<r 
African power supply sector (Cahora Basa) remained functional, 
the ability to press ahead with mass Portuguese settlement, 
and even to maintain infrastructure, was lost. Despite he^vy 
South African subsidies (via traffic routing and sub-market 
price gold deliveries in return for migrant labour) Mozambique 
became a significant drain on the Portuguese economy.
Zimbabwe’s (then Rhodesia's) post 1974 economic decline cannot 
be related primarily to the war, although it did divert human 
and budgetary resources which might otherwise have been 
devoted to achieving stabilisation and recovery. Nor did it 
inflict major direct damage to productive or infrastructural 
assets. However, by 1979 deteriorating infrastructure and 
directly productive plant and equipment, military demands on 
personpower and the fiscal and foreign exchange imbalance 
implications of escalating war had brought the macroeconomic 
position near breaking point.
The human cost of all four wars was very high. Basic rural 
services and peasant populations were severely affected by 
fiscal constraints and forced movements even when not directly 
caught up in the fighting. The numbers of killed and wounded 
combatants was high on both sides, as was that of civilian 
crossfire and/or massacre victims on the African side.
Indeed it was the human, even more than the economic cost of 
the wars in Africa which toppled the Caetano regime in 
Portugal. The losses of life and limb increased public 
discontent to explosive levels, and military failure (at least 
in Guinea de Sao and Mozambique) triggered an unresisted 
military takeover which turned into a revolution. In the case 
of Zimbabwe, the macroeconomic burden of the war (and related 
economic sanctions) and the mounting human cost (including 
significant European emigration) combined with the patent
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unlikelihood of Rhodesia ever winning it (even if military 
 ^ defeat was not immediately in sight) led to Rhodesian 
acceptance of Lancaster House and the independence process.
In the ongoing wars the costs to the occupying powers have 
become very high - perhaps two to three per cent of GDP for 
South Africa and probably a higher proportion for Morocco. 
The largest element is military, but in the Namibia case 
another substantial drain is propping up an economically as 
well as politically bankrupt puppet regime. Even offsetting 
Namibia's export surplus to countries other than RSA against 
the foreign exchange costs of the war and private sector 
profits against budgetary support leaves South Africa in 
deficit on both heads. In both cases a substantial portion of 
the armed forces are tied down on the periphery even though 
military leaders see other significant external and - at least 
in RSA - internal threats. Neither colonial economy is 
functioning well. While the basic cause would appear to be 
world mineral market conditions since the mid-1970s, the 
independence wars have created a climate of uncertainty and 
pessimism as well as a drain on state resources preventing 
stabilisation and reconstruction.
Human costs in Namibia - especially to black civilians - are 
higher than in the previous cases because over half of the 
population live in 'operational' war zones leading to 
production and basic service disruption as well as high 
incidences of torture, imprisonment and violent death. 
Military losses are lower although estimates of 3,000 to 4,000 
combatant deaths on the SWAPO and also on the South African 
(including black levies and mercenaries) side are probably of 
the right order of magnitude. In the Saharan war the civilian 
cost to the Saouris is total dislocation. Most are refugees 
in Algeria. To the Moroccans the direct cost lies in South 
Morocco and the indirect in the heavy fiscal and foreign 
exchange burden. Military casualties may be comparable to 
these in Namibia.
The post-war macroeconomic costs of independence wars have 
proven to be large. Because Angola has never known peace since 
the early 1970s and Guinea de Sao really had no serious 
colonial economy, the relevant cases are Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique.
Zimbabwe inherited a going economy and succeeded in keeping 
most of its key personnel. Indeed it moved into a boom. 
However, making good the very heavy costs of maintenance and 
replacement left undone over 1965-79, and especially 1975-79, 
has weighed heavily on the balance of payments, as has the 
1974-79 shift of incomes against profits and investment toward 
salari¡es/wages and consumption. Mozambique inherited a much 
weaker economy, very few trained black citizens and an exodus 
of 90 per cent of the Portuguese personnel who filled almost 
all posts from foremen and artisans up. In addition South 
Africa halted/reversed the transit routings, labour recrjiting
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and gold price de facto subsidies it had accorded Portugal. 
As a result it took two years (1975-76) to halt the decline 
anu two more (1977-78) of flat overall performance before 
macroeconomic recovery (from a floor 15 to 20 per cent below 
the early 1970s peak) took hold in 1979-81. Even so many key 
infrastructural assets - especially railways, harbours and 
highways - remained very badly run down.
It is worth underlining that in neither case was the key 
post-war cost primarily actual war damage. In both there were 
very substantial backlogs of undone maintenance and 
replacement and in that of Mozambique an even heavier burden 
of losing over 80 per cent of total middle and high level 
personpower.
Civil Wars: Uncivil Costs
Civil or domestic wars are defined as those breaking out 
within the borders of an independent state and not primarily 
the result of external manipulation. The latter does not 
imply lack of external support - including combat contingents 
on both sides - only that the basic dynamics of the war are 
internal even if both sides have substantial external support.
One sub-category is domestic wars in search of independence. 
The notable examples are Ethiopia/Eritrea (arguably a 
borderline case with independence wars proper), Nigeria/Biafra 
and (then) Congo Kinshasa/Katanga (another borderline case 
because of the degree of Belgian interest and manipulation). 
Each war was protracted, indeed, after two decades the first 
is continuing with no end in sight.
The macroeconomic costs of these wars have been high relative 
both to the size of the economy and to those of other shocks 
(e.g. drought, terms of trade). (The secessionist/independ­
ence seeking side has in each case had, over some periods at 
least, enough territorial control to describe it as having a 
macro-economy and civil government.) Costs have been
primarily felt in fiscal and dislocation of expenditure terms. 
The direct human costs have been high too and - in the 
Ethiopia/Eritrea and Nigeria/Biafra cases - the indirect costs 
(e.g. starvation, less of basic health facilities) even 
hiaher, at least on the independence/secession side. More
specifically direct and indirect war deaths have accounted for 
a significant per cent of total deaths. Post-war costs are 
hard to evaluate: the Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict continues to
devastate much of Eritrea and to drain resources from 
Ethiopia; the reasons why Zaire has never regained a healthy 
economy or a fully functioning nationwide government are much 
broader than the original Katanga secession interlude; Nigeria 
was bailed out by an oil boom which both cushioned
macroeconomic war costs and fuelled recovery.
Civil wars waged for autonomy rather than full independence
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include Ethiopia/Tigre and, perhaps, Uganda/Buganda. These 
. tend to be rather like those for independence but on a 
somewhat smaller scale and with less intensity. The 
Uganda/Buganda clash certainly does lie at the root of both 
Uganda's political fragility and - partly resultant - 
macroeconomic weakness, but has only sporadically been pursued 
by armed violence.
Civil wars (as opposed to military coups) to seize power at 
the centre have been relatively rare. The three main country 
cases (in which they may have become endemic) are Chad, Zaire 
and Uganda. It is hard to generalise about costs because 
these have varied sharply from period to period.
In Chad a pre-colonial North/South history of tension
re-emerged as a struggle for control of the new state. 
Initially civilian Southern governments gave way to military 
as conflict levels rose. These in turn fell to Northern 
dominated coalitions and to what have been basically mtra 
Northerner civil wars. This series of wars - characterised by 
heavy foreign support on all sides - has lasted over 25 years. 
Clearly they have prevented any significant development in 
Chad and led to human misery symbolised by refugee movements, 
mortality statistics and starvation in drought years.
At their peak periods in both Zaire - when only outside
intervention saved the Kinshasa-based state on at least two 
occasions - and in Uganda - in 1978-79 (viewing the joint 
Tanzanian/Ugandan war against Amin as civil) and over 1984-86 
(when the present government moved from insurgency and revolt 
to conquest/liberation) - the wars ravaged the economies of 
the areas fought over and crippled the macroeconomic 
functioning of the rest of the country. During periods of war 
on a lower scale the macroeconomic costs - but not necessarily 
the human - appear to have been lower. That is, they have not
been the dominant shock, policy or resource drains hampering
economic performance. Both economies and polities appear to 
illustrate the high post-war costs of a series of civil wars. 
Arguably this relates primarily to the difficulty of
constructing a government generally seen as legitimate, but
that difficulty in turn is gravely aggravated by lack of 
resources to distribute or economic opportunities to offer.
At the lower end of the intensity scale civil wars merge into 
widespread, severe armed banditry. The problem in defining 
such cases is that civil wars usually receive little publicity
until they are intense and large scale, and that recognised
governments apply the term bandits to what are quite clearly 
serious contestants for national power, for separate national 
status or for far-reaching autonomy. The present violence in 
parts of Uganda and Zaire probably does deserve the title of 
banditry. Its human costs are - in small areas - appalling; 
its macroeconomic ones are absolutely and relatively low, but 
in the context of severely overstretched external and fiscal 
balances (or rather imbalances) may have a disproportionately
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damaging impact.
Military coups and attempted coups - as such - are not usually 
wars, at least as defined here. Most are rapid (whatever the 
outcome), do little material damage, have limited fiscal 
impact and do not kill or injure many people (even among the 
protagonists). However, there can be exceptions to this rule. 
When a coup leads to a government so violent and represssive 
as to engender repeated outbreaks of new civil violence (with 
or without military support) then one does have a process of 
civil war. Sergeant Doe's and Sergeant Major Amin's coups did 
lead to governments and dynamics of that kind in Liberia anc 
Uganda respectively as - perhaps - did Colonel Bokassa's in 
the Central African Republic (although the evidence for a real 
civil war before the French coup to depose the Emperor is 
rather thin).
External Wars: Border and Broader
Small-scale external wars - i.e. wars primarily with an 
external state with at most a secondary foreign backed 
insurrectionist, secessonist or bandit component - have been 
common in SSA. To date major ones number four:
Somalia/Ethiopia; Uganda/Tanzania; South Africa/Angola; 
Rhodesia and South Africa/Mozambique.
One class of minor wars has been border clashes. At the upper 
end of the spectrum is the 1985-86 Burkina/Mali border war 
with air raids and substantial civilian loss of life. At the 
lower end are the Nigerian/Cameroun border incidents on 
ill-marked or naturally changing mountainside riverain 
boundaries. Another have been by-products of wars of national 
independence or civil wars, e.g. Portuguese attacks on Angola, 
Rhodesian on Zambia, incursions by various Zairois forces or 
factions into Tanzania, and by successive broken remnants of 
losing Ugandan forces into the Sudan. A third category could 
to date be treated as part of the second, but given its 
context and dynamic is perhaps better separated - South 
African aggression against its neighbours other than Angola 
and Mozambique (against whom it wages full scale wars).
The macroeconomic cost of the minor wars has been very 
variable and largely indirect. It has been major when the 
state attacked saw (rightly or wrongly) the clashes as likely 
to be followed up on a larger scale and allocated substantial 
fiscal, foreign exchange and human resources to building up 
military capacity to deter or contain them. Clear cases are 
Tanzania over 1963-78, Zambia and Botswana (against Rhodesia) 
in the later half of the 1970s, Zimbabwe/Zambia/Botswana/Tan­
zania (against South Africa) since 1980.
The direct human costs of these types of war have been low - 
ranging from losses comparable to a car wreck in the minor 
clashes to a couple of passenger bus disasters in the largest
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(e.g. Rhodesian raids on Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana). 
 ^The indirect costs turn largely on how much was spent on 
• preventative defence, how else it would have been utilised in 
the absence of the military threat and how severely strained 
the economy was at the time of the military expenditure.
Somalia's war of territorial expansion/irredentism against 
Ethiopia in the late 1970s had a high macroeconomic and human 
cost to both sides (and a continuing one because of deterrent
military expenditure on both sides). It laid waste
substantial - but economically marginal - areas in Ethiopia 
before the invaders were repulsed, but the principal direct 
macroeconomic costs were for military expenditure (in both 
cases partly met out of grant aid but partly by piling up
external debt) . The direct human cost was high both for the 
forces engaged and for (largely ethnic Somali) citizens in the 
area of Ethiopia fought over. (Ethiopia when victorious did 
not choose to counter-invade Somalia.) The greatest human 
costs, however, are those of the Somali refugees, probably of 
the order of 1,000 , 000 , who have fled to Somalia, cannot be 
integrated into that country's weak domestic economy, are 
understandably fearful of returning to Ethiopia and - despite 
substantial international assistance - survive under uneven 
but frequently very poor conditions. Refugees are victims - 
and usually numerous victims - of most wars. However, in most 
cases the numbers, the suddenness of the flight and the
proportion of refugees to host country population have been 
much lower.
The Uganda/Tanzania war of 1978-79 dates back to the 1971 Amin 
coup and links to the 1979-82 Tanzania solidarity/support 
forces in Uganda. Amin was openly hostile to Tanzania from 
his seizure of power - a hostility heartily reciprocated - and 
made territorial claims both as to a border area (which was a 
typical post-colonial geographic oddity but had come to see 
itself as Tanzanian) and to a corridor to the sea and a port. 
Tanzania, therefore, began upgrading its military capacity, 
including a jet squadron, armour and artillery. These added 
qualitatively different aspects to what were previously very 
low key and low technology armed forces but - except perhaps 
for artillery - were below the nominal levels of Uganda's 
buildup. Since it viewed the Amin regime as wholly 
illegitimate - it was involved in preparations for a 
tragi-comic 1972 Ugandan coup attempt (not involving Tanzanian 
forces) which went totally awry. Ugandan probing raids into 
Tanzania in 1972 and 1974 were repulsed (the largest with the 
loss of three Ugandan tanks, as an indication of scale).
Late in 1978 , Amin - partly as a result of endemic coup 
attempts and distrust of the loyalty of the most competent 
Ugandan units - launched a full scale invasion of the border 
Kagera area involving about 10,000 troops, armour and air 
raids. While military casualties were limited, 10,000 
civilians were massacred.
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Tanzania counter attacked to free Kagera, and after a pause to 
buildup moved to destroy the attacking units and their bases. 
Tanzanian public opinion, pressure from Ugandan opponents of 
Amin, arguments from some Tanzanian leaders that the costs of 
allowing Amin to recover and threaten a new war would be 
insupportable and Amin's all too believable threat to massacre 
the hundreds of thousands of Ugandans who had welcomed the 
columns seizing the bases, then resulted in Tanzania deciding 
to join Ugandan opponents of Amin in a war to overthrow the 
Amin regime.
Following the end of that war (at its peak involving perhaps
30,000 Tanzanian, 8,000 anti-Amin Ugandan, 15,000 pro-Amin 
Ugandan, 10,000 Nubian and 4,000 Libyan troops), Tanzania - at 
the request of four successive Uganda governments - kept 
solidarity forces to maintain some degree of interim security 
and to allow elections leading to the formation of a stable 
Ugandan government.
The macroeconomic costs to Tanzania, discussed in a later 
section, were (and their consequences are) very high, probably 
in the order of $675 mn on foreign exchange account. This 
figure is significantly above peak export earnings ($550 mn in 
1985) and almost twice current levels.
For Uganda the macroeconomic and human costs of the Amin 
period and the war have been even more disastrous. Direct 
deaths from war under Amin and since 1981 have probably 
exceeded 500,000, while indirect deaths from starvation and 
destroyed health services related to transport blockages and 
to fiscal bankruptcy would - if known - be likely to raise the 
total to over 750,000 . Some estimates in press and human 
rights group reports would come to double that figure. The 
point is the scale - at least five per cent of the number of 
Ugandans - and the very real horror that scale implies. The 
emergence of a predatory dominant parallel economy - magendo - 
in the post-war vacuum has never been fully reversed. The 
broken pre-Amin political process (always fragile) has, like 
Humpty Dumpty, proved impossible to put together again. Even 
if President Museveni can reconstruct Ugandan polity, society 
and economy - and this remains problematic - the costs of Amin 
plus war and their consequences are likely to total at least 
$15,000 mn lost GDP (1971-1990) contrasting actual 1972-1986 
results with a three per cent annual growth average and
1,000,000 direct and indirect loss of life. The direct 
Tanzania/Uganda war cost is a very small fraction of the total 
(say $500 mn and 10 ,000 lives) and the pre-war (Amin) and 
post-war costs have causes related to internal Ugandan factors 
other than war. However, in this case it is somewhat 
articifical to seek to divide up at least over 1972-1986. 
Uganda was (and to a lesser extent is) a country at war both 
internally and, on occasion, with its neighbours.
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South Africa vs Southern Africa: A Region at War
The South Africa/Angola and Rhodesia/South Africa wars are 
examined in more detail in an accompanying paper, 'Cutting Off 
The Flowers'. Their duration and costs are comparable to the 
total human and macroeconomic costs of Amin, war and failure 
to recreate a functional, legitimate state in Uganda. 
Realistically they are unlikely to end until the destruction 
of apartheid in South Africa, although South African policy 
shifts induced by raising the cost to RSA of its present 
approaches (including external pressures) could reduce them 
significantly.
In Angola the initial 1975 position was one of a civil war 
between a dominant liberation movement (MPLA) and two much 
weaker ones (FLNA, UNITA) with a limited regional basis and 
major to dominant external dependence (Zaire/USA and Portugal 
respectively). Foreseeing defeat in elections or civil war, 
the two turned to the USA and South Africa for the forces, 
equipment and finance to capture power. Both - despite that 
support - were routed, but UNITA was resurrected as a South 
African proxy force. At first Angola was used as a buffer for 
South Africa's occupation of Namibia and a means to prevent 
stabilisation and development of the Angolan economy. Since 
1980 South Africa's goals have broadened, although exactly 
what they are remains unclear. In this war there has been 
massive deployment of South African forces up to numbers over
10,000, including mercenaries plus air, artillery and logistic 
services for UNITA.
The war against Mozambique has a distinctly different profile. 
Initially it was waged by Rhodesia to destroy the Zimbabwe 
liberation forces led by Robert Mugabe and to deny them 
Mozambican bases. Renamo (or MNR, described as armed bandits 
by Mozambique) was overtly created by Rhodesia as a proxy 
force to destroy Mozambican support for Zimbabwean liberation 
by sabotage and terrorism while Rhodesian forces raided 
Mozambican provincial towns and transport lines as well as 
Zimbabwean camps.
After Zimbabwean independence the MNR was inherited by South 
Africa. Until mid-1981 it was used on a limited scale to 
destabilise Mozambique by low grade sabotage and terrorism. 
From 1981 it has been steadily upgraded (the 1974 Nkomati 
non-intervention agreement notwithstanding) to the point in 
late 1986 that near total collapse of the economy was a 
reality and effective government in central and northern 
Mozambique appeared a real possibility. Since then there has 
been a substantial clawback on the military front and a more 
problematic one on the economic, but both fronts could still 
be described as desperate.
While South Africa has staged sabotage raids into Mozambique 
and supplied logistical, equipment, finance, training and 
strategic plus some field leadership for the MNR, it has not
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made any commitment of its own forces, or of financial 
resources, comparable to that in Angola.
Until late 1986 the MNR - unlike UNITA - made no serious 
attempts to articulate a political project or mobilise even a 
regional following. The 1987 efforts have something of the 
appearance of special effect laid or. for foreign observers 
(like UNITA's South African protected 'capital' enclave of 
Jamba), but do represent at least a pjblic relations shift. 
South Africa's goals in Mozambique appear to be destroying 
Mozambique's transport system, economy and polity as a means 
to maintain its economic hegemony over the landlocked 
independent Southern African scates, to guard against any 
military or base area support for the AN'C and to 'prove' that 
independence under black socialist governments can be equated 
with violence, chaos and economic collacse.
Solidarity Forces: Costs of Defence Cooperation
The final war category is that of solidarity forces. Nigeria 
sent the first to Tanzania to provide interim defence security 
and retraining following an army mutiny and violent strike. 
Nigeria has subsequently taken part in a notably unsuccessful 
multi-country force (also involving Zaire and several smaller 
West African contingents) to attempt to provide cover for the 
creation of a unified government in Chad. It has seriously 
considered sending similar forces to Angola (1975) and 
Mozambique (currently) but has not done so, partly because of 
doubts by the would-be recipients of their effectiveness.
Similarly, Senegal sent troops to Gambia - on the request of 
its government - in 1981 to thwart a coup attempt. It has 
kept them there, still on the request of the Gambian 
government, which has over the period twice been re-elected in 
competitive elections, to provide stability against further 
coup attempts or external interventions.
In these cases the solidarity forces engaged in no significant 
combat and were not intended to do so. As a result, human 
costs were virtually nil and macroeconomic costs limited. The 
same is true of Tanzania's small solidarity forces, sent at 
the request of the governments of the Seychelles and the 
Comoros. The first thwarted two externally based (one South 
African mounted) coup attempts; the second was expelled by a 
successful externally based, mercenary executed invasion/coup.
The Tanzanian (1975-78, 1986-??) and Zimbabwean (1983-??)
solidarity forces sent to help defend Mozambique against first 
Rhodesia and later South Africa and their proxy MNR (and in 
the second case to keep open Zimbabwe's transport corridor to 
Beira) are quite different in three respects: they are larger, 
more costly (especially economically but also in lives) and 
directly engaged in combat.
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1In the case of Zimbabwe the cost of up to 12 , 000 troops in 
Mozambique to defend the Beira corridor and co conduct joint 
■ exercises with Mozambican forces is now c-stimated as of the 
order of $350-400 mn a year, and the annual cost in Zimbabwean 
lives is probably numbered in scores. The Tanzanian 
involvement is discussed in a later section but has tended to 
be at lower levels - perhaps up to half as many troops, much 
less heavy equipment and perhaps a fifth as high maximum 
annual cost.
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ASPECTS AND COMPONENTS OF COST
The most evident and cited aspects of war costs are military 
expenditure above some minimum 'normal' threshold (say five 
per cent of budget in several cases of SSA states with no - or 
before they had - serious military threat to their integrity 
or survival) and/or their foreign exchange content. Less 
frequently direct war damage is cited. However, these would 
appear to be only two of seven components of macroeconomic war 
cost:
1. direct war damage (including non-military aspects such as 
destruction of roads and physical disruption of
non-military production);
2. excess military expenditure (including deterrent and
solidarity heads) and especially its foreign exchange 
content;
3. economic spill-over costs - e.g. transport blockages or 
cost increases and refugee inflows - from adjacent wars;
4. non-maintenance or non-replacement of capital stock as a 
result of limited financial or foreign exchange resources 
directly or indirectly consequential on war costs;
5. when there is a large, sudden leap in war costs
(analagous in macroeconomic terms to a severe
deterioration in the terms of trade or a major drought), 
the shock impact on usually fragile macroeconomic 
systems;
6. the multiplier impact of the three previous items on 
non-military GDP, especially in the presence of severe 
budgetary and/or foreign exchange constraints;
7. strategic and policy distraction, i.e. the simple facts 
that during a major war it is not possible to focus 
government attention on medium - or sometimes even short 
- term macro and sectoral economic strategy, policy and 
implementation and also that - in a serious war context -
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military expenditure is harder to control than any other 
category.
Military bills presumably do not require illustration, nor 
does literal military destruction. However, the damage to 
roads of military traffic (especially tracked vehicles), the 
dislocation of actual production or transport of both 
agricultural and industrial output as well as of basic rural 
services, and the cost to production of diverting scarce high 
and middle level personpower to war are often passed by. The 
first twc were very significant in Tanzania/Uganda, and 
perhaps to a somewhat lesser extent in Nigeria/Biafra, 
Ethiopia/Eritrea and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. They are at their 
highest in Mozambique/South Africa and Angola/South Africa in 
which, between destruction and dislocation, GDP in Mozambique 
and non-oil GDP in Angola have been cut by at least 50 per 
cent below counter factual peacetime levels, with dislocation 
probably more crushing than literal destruction. The
personnel cost (i.e. reduction in productivity of non-military 
sectors) was most evident in Rhodesia where all white males 
were part-time soldiers, but must be severe in any case in 
which a substantial number of artisans, professionals and 
managers have to be reallocated to the armed forces.
Non-maintenance and non-replacement of fixed assets over 
1974-79 (and to a lesser extent 1965-73) by Rhodesia, 
primarily because of war and sanctions scissors effect on 
foreign exchange available for non-military imports has 
imposed very heavy burdens on Zimbabwe. This illustrates the 
post-war costs of war, i.e. asset loss or non-creation during 
a war will affect flows of income (GDP) unless and until the 
capital stock shortfall is made good. Because the domestic 
financial constraints were less severe, maintenance and 
replacement of low import content assets was largely kept up 
so that the deferred cost manifested itself in an explosive 
rise of che investment imports/Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
ratio in the four years after independence. The Nacala-Malawi 
railway is an even more extreme case. It was completed by 
Portugal at the end of the 1960s as the liberation war in 
Mozambique reached a high level of intensity, albeit it rarely 
directly disrupted the line. This illustrates the post-war 
costs of war, i.e. asset loss or non-creation during a war 
will affect flows of income (GDP) unless and until the capital 
stock shortfall is made good. Nonetheless, it was nearly 
non-funct iona 1 over much of its length by 1980 . The reason 
for this was that line of rail and rolling stock maintenance 
and replacement was near nil throughout the decade because of 
both budgetary and foreign exchange constraints imposed by war 
on both the Portuguese colonial regime and the independent 
Mozambican governments.
The relative importance of these cost categories varies 
widely, as do their levels (singly or together) relative to 
GDP or NCP (net domestic product less asset wear and tear). 
Each is significant in some SSA economies and at least the
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first and sixth in a majority of them.
These categories, unless very carefully defined, are not 
aggregatable without double count ing and - in practice - 
omissions. If there are more exogenous shocks than war the 
allocation of costs among them poses conceptual problems, 
because of non-linearity. That is, resilience and ability to 
live with reallocation decline as the intensity and the 
duration of the shock rise. This is a general not a war 
specific characteristic, as has been recognised in 
constrasting specific SSA economy stabilisation and adjustment 
efforts and comparative average SSA performance over 1973-75 
and 1979 to date.
There are five quite different approaches to costing measuring 
against different counter factual (i.e. non-war) situations:
a) Short term loss of GDP as normally measured (including 
'value added'? in the defence, refugee, additional repair 
and related sectors, basically their wage bills). In 
part this results from production directly prevented by 
war. Another part results from allocating scarce inputs 
from sectors with higher value added to input ratios. 
For example, if military spending has a 50% import 
component and the rest of the economy 25% then current 
GDP will fall as foreign exchange is shifted from other 
sectors to the military.
b) Short term loss of non-military GDP (including refugee, 
excess maintenance and other war related sub-sectors in 
the deductions). This is the previous estimate of loss 
plus the GDP which accounting principles assign to the 
war sectors, but is hard to justify counting as a welfare 
or production gain.
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c) Immediate war costs. This is the hardest to define 
precisely or to give a clear conceptual meaning - albeit 
for data availability reasons it is what is usually 
calculated/estimated. Direct war damage, loss of current 
production related to war, extra external trade costs (or 
revenue losses) of the war beyond the production losses, 
extra repairs and refugee/displaced person costs and some 
portion of military expenditures are usually included. 
The 1985 SADCC estimate - and its revised Green and 
Thompson variant in Destructive Engagement - is basically 
a fairly sophisticated variant of this approach. What it 
really estimates - when approximately correct - is 
current non-military Net Domestic Product loss from that 
year's (or period's) war. Destroyed assets do not - 
except for immediate loss of output - reduce GDP. 
However, because they represent an excess depreciation 
item they increase the depreciation reduction from GDP 
necessary to arrive at GNP. Beyond one year this 
approach runs into problems (as in practice do a) and b)) 
because of the problem of estimating current year income
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(GDP) loss from prior year's detruction of capital stock 
and reduction of investment.
d) Overall GDP loss. Nominally this could be estimated 
directly including the present loss of GDP from past loss 
of assets and investment (including investment in ability 
of people to work productively, e.g. health, education, 
water supply lost to war). In practice this has not been 
attempted in SSA and given data problems may at present 
be impracticable. An alternative approach is to estimate 
probable GDP trends in the absence of war costs and 
calculate the diversion from achieved GDP - the basic 
approach used in Children cn the Front Line.
e) Logically this could be combined with c) to compute Net
Domestic Product losses which would then take into
account the 'realised' capital stock losses which would
result in future (including post-war) GDP losses. In 
practice this has not been attempted.
Various short cut variants can be employed. One is to 
estimate foreign exchange costs (assuming the most binding 
constraint on the economy to be import capacity) of war and to 
multiply this by the average or incremental GDP/import ratio 
to arrive at GDP (strictu sensu non-military GDP) loss.
Spill-over Costs; Dislocation of People and Production
Spill-over costs of adjacent wars have three main aspects - 
military incursions, transport or other cost-raising 
dislocations, and refugee flows. The first is included in 
precautionary and deterrent military expenditure, but not the 
second or third. The most important examples are Southern 
African and result from South Africa's systematic destruction 
- directly and by proxy forces - of Angolan and Mozambican 
transport routes. For Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia and Zaire this 
has resulted in very sharp increases in freight costs 
(reflected in lower fob prices for exports and higher cif 
prices for imports) because they are forced to use more 
distant ports - primarily East London and Durban in South 
Africa. Semi-official cost estimates for Zimbabwe and Malawi 
each exceed $100 mn a year (on some estimates they approach 
$150 mn) and the total for Zaire and Zambia together may be of 
the same order of magnitude. In the case of Malawi this cost 
represents about 30 to 50 per cent of export earnings. As a 
result the macroeconomic cost of war is very heavy, despite 
there being a small army and no combat. Indeed Malawi 
arguably, could reduce its war costs by combatting the MNR 
forces transitting its territory and acting jointly with 
Mozambique to defend the corridor to its natural port of 
Nacala. Since December 1986, Malawi has taken some initial 
steps toward such a strategy.
Refugee flows from major wars have been a particularly heavy
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burden for the Sudan, Somalia and - during the
^Rhodesia/Zimbabwe independence war - Zambia. Both war, 
expulsion of aliens, drought and economic disaster have driven 
refugees to a majority of SSA states. In the absence of other 
significant war costs they do not usually represent a 
crippling burden at the macroeconomic level. They do, 
however, represent a major human cost of war, a topic treated 
separately below.
However, most war-dislccated human beings in SSA are not
refugees in the formal international definition of that term. 
They are internal refugees or dislocated persons. Of total 
war displaced Africans who at present probably number at least
22,500,000 (about 11,000,000 from or, usually, in Angola and 
Mozambique with the Sudan, Uganda, Zaire, Chad, 
Ethiopia/Eritrea, the Sahara Democratic Republic and Namibia 
also the sources of very large numbers). Cross border
refugees - not all from war - number under 5,000,000. Another 
distinction can be made between internal refugees totally 
dependent on state or outside agency support for survival and 
displaced persons managing to exist (but often little more, 
and with high mortality rates especially for infants, young 
children and the aged) on their own or with purely local
assistance. In the case of Mozambique, of 6,000,000 - odd 
displaced persons perhaps 300,000 are cross-border refugees
(though a majority are not internationally recognised or 
supported as such), 800,000 internal refugees and nearly
5,000,000 displaced persons surviving with little help beyond 
what nearby relatives or local communities can provide. The 
problem with the last distinction is that the borderline 
depends more on resource availability and state access than on 
need or degree of deprivation. In Mozambique, if the state 
had the resources and could reach all the displaced persons,
the number in the internal refugee category (somewhat 
confusingly officially termed displaced persons by Mozambique) 
would probably be increased to over 2,000,000. Certainly 
Mozambican estimates of those at risk of starvation in the 
absence of emergency food aid reached 4,000,000 in early 1987, 
of whom perhaps two-thirds were displaced persons.
The costs of dislocation (normally rural to rural, albeit with 
urban to rural and rural to urban strands as well) in lost 
production are very real and not necessarily short term. 
Dislocation usually involves loss of tools, seed, food stocks, 
livestock, growing crops and some land improvements or tree
crops. Virtually by definition it entails the loss of 
housing. Therefore first year output losses - except in the 
rare cases in which a moderate income job or self-employed 
activity can be found quickly - are likely to be total. In 
the absence of substantial external support capital stock 
rebuilding and diversion of attention to recreating a home,
output'recovery will take several years. Indeed it may take 
that long even with it. Perhaps 250,000 former Rwandaise and 
Burundian refugees in Tanzania are now integrated into 
Tanzanian life (and in a majority of cases citizenship) and
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probably have at least regained their former levels of 
production and welfare, as well as recreating or creating new 
social and communal relations patterns. But most Rwandaise 
refugees came over 1960-62 and most Burundian over the same
period and in 1972. The earliest one could have claimed 
substantial recovery for the former group was at the end of
the 1960s, despite very substantial UNHCR and Tanzanian 
assistance and a nearly immediate decision to seek to rebuild 
their lives in villages (or other occupations on an individual 
basis) in Tanzania with very little time wasted pursuing an 
unreal hope of return.
Indeed, in cases such as Mozambique full recovery is
inconceivable so long as the war continues. Displaced 
peasants move to areas in which they believe they will be less 
at risk. These are either areas apparently free from battles 
or organised 'armed bandit' (MNR) terrorism - a somewhat vain 
quest so far as the latter goes - or ones where it is believed 
security forces exist who can protect them. The latter belief 
may also be misplaced at times - when a Zambesia mine was 
overrun in mid-1986 the population was about 25,000, 1,000
miners and families and 25,000 displaced persons; the 350 dead 
in the mid-1987 Homoine massacre probably included many 
displaced persons reassured by the presence of a police post 
(which the terrorists did not capture but bottled up) and the 
absence of any military or any significant economic target.
Both beliefs, however, do inform moves and affect settlement 
patterns. As of 1980 perhaps 20 per cent of the population in 
Tete and Sofala provinces lived within 20 kilometres of the 
Beira-Zimbabwe rail/road/pipeline and Malawi-Zimbabwe highway 
routes. Now it is estimated that at least 40 per cent (and
perhaps as high as 80 per cent in Sofala) do so. Similarly,
in the Southern Provinces the armed bandits unabated (indeed 
increasingly savage) terrorism combined with their general 
failure and increasing reluctance to attempt attacks on 
garrisoned towns and key economic installations has 
concentrated populations in peri-urban areas and along roads 
and rail lines. This results in heavy spot overpopulation 
(often on land that was initially marginal) and in growing 
ecological damage. Together with the risk of further 
terrorist attacks and/or another forced displacement, these 
factors guarantee that output recovery will be slow and 
par t ial.
The emphasis on support and - especially - production costs is 
not intended to imply that human and social costs are less. 
Traumatic shock, social (and often household) fragmentation 
and disintegration, slow reconstruction of lives and 
communities, debilitating alienation and loss of morale are 
humanly every bit as damnable and costly. But they fall into
the area of* human costs (except as they deter output) not
macroeconomic, which is the theme of this section, and they 
require primarily sociological and psychological, not applied 
political economic, skills and experience to analyse.
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The Macroeconomic Implications of Shock and Distraction
fhe multiplier effect is a widely used macroeconomic tool 
whose relevance to any autonomous decrease in supply or 
increase in non-productive demand should not require 
explanation. Briefly it points to the secondary and tertiary 
consequences at any one time and over time of an initial cost 
or diversion of resources. However, it has to date very 
rarely been applied to direct detailed war costs in SSA. 
Given marginal import/GDP ratios and the dislocative impact of 
war expenditure-fuelled inflation on production generally, and 
the external balance (or more accurately imbalance) in 
particular, an estimate of total GDP loss (or at any rate
non-defence GDP loss) of the order of five times war foreign
exchange costs does not appear to be an unreasonable starting 
point. ' In the case of Angola and Mozambique, estimates on
this basis for 1980-86 (presented in Children on the Front
Lane, UNICEF, 1987) tend to confirm - at least as to order of 
magnitude - estimates built up from direct war costs and 
specified consequential production losses and those based on 
counter factual projections of GDP growth in the absence of 
war.
Schematically, the basic costs to (non-military) GDP are 
production destroyed, non-military production prevented by 
transfer of resources from other sectors to the military, and 
both production losses and increased (repair or alternative) 
expenditure resulting from specific assets being out of 
operation, preventing or crippling production of other assets: 
e.g. in Mozambique the coal mine at Moatize is itself 
undamaged but the war's closure of its access rail line has 
put the mine out of operation. The direct subsequent costs 
are future production losses from destroyed assets and those 
not built during the war (because of resource diversion or 
physical impossibility). Assuming a detailed computable input 
output matrix, the direct impact of resource losses and 
reallocations can be measured quite easily. In practice there 
are tlpree problems: computable, detailed open input-output
matrices are not available in SSA and if they were the data 
are frequently too fragmentary to have much confidence in 
their use except as a cross check on other methods of 
estimation. Second, 1-0 based models are usually designed to 
measure marginal, gradual changes, not sudden, non-marginal 
ones. Third, the productivity impact of transferring skilled 
personnel to the military is not caught by such models nor is 
the loss of health (ability :o work hard), education 
(productivity of work), time (diverted to household 
restoration instead of production) and morale resulting from 
war.
The simpler techniques, e.g. foreign exchange diverted times 
GDP/imports (or a sectoral breakdown) do not meet the last 
point. Indeed, it is doubtful that any approach used in SSA 
to date other than the non-war (counterfactual) versus war 
(actual) GDP growth has any claim to doing so.
Shock impact has been relatively less explored in 
macroeconomic analysis of SSA economies. It has, however, 
been increasingly seen as significant both in relation to 
major natural disasters (e.g. Sahel droughts) and sudden, 
massive negative terms of trade movements. The basic 
proposition is that, beyond some level, increased resource 
demands (or reduced supply) and policy strains become 
unmanageable, and macroeconomic term strategy and policy 
deteriorate into an increasingly fragmented and short term 
series of measures to postpone disaster until something good 
turns up. War is particularly likely to have this effect - 
especially as over-optimism as to the likely duration and 
level of war costs, as well as underestimation of indirect 
costs, appears to be endemic, e.g. in Tanzania, Mozambique and 
Z imbabwe.
Strategic and policy distraction from both short and, 
especially, long term macroeconomic concerns, once stated, is 
presumably both self-explanatory and unlikely to be 
challenged. The history of Rhodesian policy as the liberation 
war grew is one of decreasing ability to pay coherent 
attention to non-military issues or to contain military 
spending. While probably less true on the strategy and policy 
front (though not the military budget one), the same challenge 
has confronted Zimbabwe since 1981, and especially since the 
build-up of its solidarity and transport defence forces in 
Mozambique began in 1983.
Human Costs - Lives and Misery
Analagous constricted vision and underestimation of costs has 
characterised the human price of war. Combat and crossfire 
civilian deaths are the only regularly mentioned aspect, with 
the exception of the three Southern African studies mentioned 
earlier and the UNICEF report in particular. It is possible 
to identify six main aspects or components of costs:
1. direct military/combatant casualties, including militias 
and semi-organised forces;
2. civilian casualties including crossfire victims as well 
as those massacred by terrorist tactics, killed in 
selective sabotage attacks and falling victim to 
unselective over-reaction by government and/or invader or 
insurrectionist forces;
3. victims of increased mortality - especially infants and 
young children - resulting from destruction or breakdown 
of health and pure water services as a direct or indirect 
effect of war;
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4. victims of starvation resulting from war caused 
dislocation of food production or blocking of relief food 
distr ibut ion;
5. non-lethal human costs of dislocation of people, 
production and services caused directly by war;
6. the multiplier (divider) effect on production, incomes 
and access to basic services.
As with macroeconomic costs, the absolute and relative 
significance of these components vary widely, but all have 
been at very high levels in five or more SSA states. Military 
and combatant casualties are in fact usually a small 
proportion of war-related deaths - probably under five per 
cent in Angola and Mozambique and two to three per cent in 
Tanzania. Genuinely accidental crossfire victims are probably 
an even smaller proportion. Estimates of direct military 
casualties (and hopelessly unreliable figures put out by 
warring parties) do exist, but are not by themselves very 
useful because they are a small and uneven fraction of war 
deaths as defined here.
Terrorist tactic victims are much more numerous in some wars - 
notably Mozambique and Angola/South Africa, but also the 
Ugandan, Chadian and Sudanese civil wars. Terrorist tactics 
are here defined as attacks on human or material targets 
designed to cause fear and dislocation and/or to wipe out 
highly valued services (e.g. health posts, schools, shops, 
local transport) and their staff. Their goal is killing the 
dream of development and undermining perceived legitimacy by 
reducing both service and security provision, not their direct 
military or economic impact. In other terminology they are 
aimed at 'soft targets'. Over-reaction by combatant forces is 
very common - especially when acquiescence in the presence of 
forces hostile to those entering or controlling an area from 
fear is hard to differentiate from willed cooperation, and/or 
the area is perceived as basically hostile oy the forces in 
question.
The largest single war-related death toll, especially in the 
case of combat within a country, is usually increased infant 
and under-five mortality related to direct destruction of 
health services, their immobilisation or inaccessibility as a 
result of combat or human dislocation, and their deter ioration 
because of war claims on fiscal and foreign exchange 
resources. For Angola and Mozambique over 1930-86, carefully 
constructed estimates in the UNICEF study total 500,000 war 
related infant and young child deaths, now runnina one every 
four minutes or, as UNICEF Executive Director James Grant put 
it, comparable to crashing a fully-loaded Jumbo jet of 
under-fives daily. Even in Tanzania, where the mortality 
deterioration (relative to pre-1978 trends) is the result of 
the divider effect of war-caused macroeconomic malaise, this 
1979-36 death toll probably exceeds 125,000 souls. War
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related increases in older child and adult mortality - except 
for mass starvation - are significant but significantly 
smaller (and harder to estimate) than for infants and young 
children because older children and adults (except the aged or 
already infirm) are less physically vulnerable.
Mass starvation because of destruction of crops, dislocation 
of farmers, armed intervention to prevent food distribution
and the divider effect on food imports capacity has killed 
several hundred thousand Africans over the past two decades. 
Usually but not always (e.g. Mozambique over 1986/87 where
3,500,000 to 4,000,000 human beings are in danger of severe 
malnutrition or literal starvation despite relatively 
favourable weather) unfavourable climatic conditions have been 
a catalytic factor. The vast majority of the victims have
been Angolans, Mozambicans, Sudanese, Ethiopians/Eritreans/ 
Somalis, Chadians, Biafrans, Nigerians, South Sudanese and
West Nile and Karamojang Ugandans. Except for Somali refugees 
from Ethiopia in Somalia camps and Ugandan and 
Ethiopian/Eritrean refugees in the Sudan, all of these cases 
involve long, bitter wars (whether civil or externally 
generated) within the country experiencing famine.
Dislocation involves literally millions of households. 
Estimates include up to half the rural populations of Angola 
and Mozambique - i.e. 4,500,000 and 5,000,000 human beings 
respectively and perhaps over a quarter in Chad, Uganda, and 
the Southern Sudan - of the order of another 6,000,000. 
Dislocation has high human costs even at the non-lethal level. 
Refugees from war - as from drought - have usually lost
literally everything: home, land, household equipment, tools
and seeds, livestock, access to public services. Even if they 
survive, they are in abject poverty and frequently unable even 
to begin reconstructing their lives and household incomes 
without substantial direct and infrastructural suppport. War 
makes the resources for adequate levels of such support quite 
literally unavailable for more than a small minority. 
Security concerns (of the dislocated human being and/or of the 
state) may force those dislocated to remain in overcrowded or 
agriculturally unsuitable areas because there they may have 
some protection, while if they returned to their homes they 
would have none.
Trans-border refugees are conceptually and humanly an extreme 
case of dislocation, e.g. of over 6,000,000 displaced
Mozambicans 300,000 odd nave fled to Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, 
Swaziland and the Republic of South Africa. There are
practical differences: they may be in greater danger of
expulsion bacx into the combat zone (e.g Mozambicans in South 
Africa); they cannot fully begin rehabilitation of their lives 
and livelihoods until they are able to return home (as most 
Zimbabwe refugees in Zambia did after independence) or decide 
and are allowed to integrate into the host country (as 100,000 
Rwandais and Burundians have in Tanzania); because of the 
international definition of refugee they may receive more
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International assistance than refugees (dislocated people) in 
their own country.
The negative multiplier effect of macroeconomic war costs 
applies to the dislocated and to other citizens of severely 
war affected countries. Resource diversion means that access 
to basic services deteriorates (as does their quality), inputs 
and markets for production shrink as do job opportunities and 
goods to buy. The percentage of households in absolute 
poverty rises. These human costs can be very marked even in 
an economy which has had very little combar within its
territory - e.g. Tanzania.
It may need underlining that the cessation of hostilities or 
major external threats does not bring macroeconomic or human 
war costs to an end immediately. hor does it do so even after 
the armed forces are cut back to 'normal' personnel and
expenditure levels - by no means a quick or easy exercise, as
Nigeria and Zimbabwe illustrate. The cumulative impact on the 
economy continues to exist until at the least the past direct 
and divider war costs no longer prevent normal growth of
exports, basic services and GDP or - logically - until 
recovery has restored these to the levels they would have 
attained in the absence of war. Even under favourable
external and domestic conditions, the former can take several
years and the latter over a decade. At worst - as illustrated 
by Uganda - it may be virtually impossible to make and to 
sustain a stabilisation, adjustment and recovery strategy for 
up to a decade after the end of the actual war.
There are a set of interactions between human and production 
costs which are conceptually and qualitatively relatively
straightforward but exceedingly hard to quantify, even 
approximately. One cluster relates to loss of access to basic 
services, especially health-education-pure water. Ill health 
reduces ability to produce directly and by requiring time 
reallocation by household members caring for sick persons. 
Lack of education reduces productivity. Albeit this is a 
future more than a current GDP loss, unless the war situation 
lasts for many years. A number of SSA wars, e.g. Uganda, 
Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia/Er1 trea, Mozambique, Angola, Sahara 
Democratic Republic have lasted (with at most brief
interludes) for up to a quarter century. Lack of access to 
improved water sources diverts time from production, e.g. what 
takes 20 minutes a day to fetch from a villag tap or well can 
easily take 10 times as long from a spring, watercourse or 
pond three to five miles away.
A second cluster relates to time (necessarily and properly) 
diverted from production to household restoration or survival. 
Persons who are dislocated or whose homes suffer damage need 
to devote time to locating, patching or recreating a roof over 
their heads and then to making it habitable. Scattered 
families spend time looking for missing members. War-imposed 
goods scarcities result in more absenteeism and less
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cultivation because people are out hunting fot scarce 
commod i t ies.
A third cluster flows from shock and loss of morale. War in 
one's immediate vicinity (even if one is personally physically 
and materially unscathed) often has a profound psychological 
impact and can be traumatic. While the relevant literature - 
mostly not on SSA - is largely in the fields of psychology and 
sociology and so does not attempt macroeconomic or general 
productivity cost estimates, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the latter are significant. Initially (and after a victory) a 
war may boost morale, effort and productivity. A long drawn 
out war, repeated defeats, problematic futures and the 
worsened economic and access to services context caused by war 
bills do erode morale. This nas been widely recognised as a 
factor in driving the rebel Rhodesian government to Lancaster 
House, and in fact to capitulation. It has been less 
discussed as a drag on productivity, but is clearly likely to 
be so even at levels well below those leading to surrender or 
ending the war on unfavourable terms.
A more extended sketch of types of war involvement and of 
component and total cost estimates for a single country may be 
useful to illustrate this and the previous section. A 
presentation follows for Tanzania as a country with 
significant war costs - albeit not a civil war, and with very 
limited fighting on its own soil.
IV
TANZANIA: MOUNTAIN TIPS AND MISTS - A MINI CASE STUDY
Tanzania is a good example of how little the costs of war are 
assessed in any depth, and how brief passing references may 
conceal more than they reveal. Despite not infrequent mention 
of the cost of the war following the Amin invasion of 1978 , 
with very rare exceptions these are not seriously evaluated as 
a cause of post 1973 economic problems. The costs of 
near-perpetual preparedness for external war (invasion or 
incursion) since 1961 and of repeated acceptance of solidarity 
support costs for threatened neighbours have received even 
less attention.
Tanzania is a good example for another reason. It does not 
and never has had either a military government, a substantial 
military role in the political process nor what can reasonably 
be called militarisation. Nor has it had a civil war, a 
policy (actually or in intent) of expansionism nor any desire 
to use a large military establishment as an instrument to 
enhance a regional or continental leadership role. The army 
has never been used - or needed - for police functions, and 
strike riot, or endemic banditry violence are relatively rare 
and low level. These factors strongly suggest that military
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Spending in the absence of real war or perceived threats of it 
would have been low and that actual spending is related to 
war, not repression nor a 'toys for the boys' accommodation 
with a politically powerful officer corps.
The one exception to this pattern is the 1974 mutiny of part 
of the original, British trained (and then still in part 
officered) army. Even that - especially in retrospect - 
appears to have been more a violent, trade union style strike 
for improved terms, conditions and promotion prospects rather 
than a true military strike for power. In the event it was
blocked by use of external solidarity forces - initially 
3ritish and subsequently Nigerian. The costs of the mutiny in 
physical, damage, demobilisation, rerecruitment and retraining 
appear to have been quite low and tne pattern has never 
recurred.
However, Tanzania is distinctly atypical in the lov; level of
actual fighting that has taken place on its territory. There
have been numerous Portuguese and Ugandan and - less frequent 
- Rhodesian, Zairean elements (not the governmental forces) 
and Burundian incursions, raids and sabotage operations, but 
these were relatively small individually or cumulatively. The 
only major invasion - of Kagera (then West Lake) Region by 
Amin in 1978 - was limited in extent and duration even if
remarkably sanguinary (probably 10,000 civilians murdered in 
two weeks) while it lasted.
Cost Elements
The main direct and first stage indirect war costs fall into 
three categories: preparedness for external aggression,
solidarity with threatened or attacked neighbours, and the 
Amin invasion and its aftermath. The first has been 
significant since independence and more so from 1963/64 (with 
the opening of Frelimo's armed struggle for the liberation of 
Mozambique) and the second - somewhat discontinuously - since 
1975 (and the independence of Mozambique) . Only the Uganda 
case has clearcut dates - 1978-82. Within the costs it is the 
foreign exchange component which is the most critical 
Tanzania has normally not had serious shortages of food nor of 
semi-skilled (i.e. with militia or national service training) 
recruits and the bulk of other expenditure is directly or 
indirectly a foreign exchange cost. These can, with some 
difficulty and little exactitude, be estimated from Tanzania 
budgets and budget speeches (see also note on sources).
Over 1961-70 the foreign exchange cost of a larger than 
otherwise requisite armed force to deter or defend against 
Portuguese, and also Zairean elements, incursions and 
potential invasions was probably of the order of $150 mn. 
That in itself was not a crippling cost, but the average of 
$15 mn a year did represent up to seven and a half per cent of 
export earnings. This figure includes an element of support
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to FRELIMO, which was waging its war of independence in part 
from bases, training camps and civil government structures in 
Tanzania. Toward the end of this period decisions were taken 
which were to lead to substantial subsequent expenditure to
build up artillery, armoured vehicle and air capacities.
The period 1971 to November 1978 was marked by much higher war 
(or war deterrence/defence preparation) costs for three 
reasons. First, the decisions of the late 1960s; second, the 
creation of an unstable, aggressive and anti-Tanzanian Ugandan 
state and armed forces by Idi Amin (including border
incursions and a probing proto-invasion repulsed in 1972) ;
third, the provision of forces to protect the new state in
Mozambique from Rhodesian attack.
The total costs in foreign exchange were probably of the order 
of $200 mn - perhaps 20-25 per cent relating to solidarity 
with Mozambique and 65-70 per cent or more to actual and 
preparatory defence against Amin's Uganda. Costs related to 
continued protection (until 1974) against Portuguese
incursions, Rhodesian sabotage raids and attacks on border 
areas (nominally against refugees) by Colonel Micombero's
Burundian regime were much smaller. Thus by the beginning of 
the Amin War the cumulative foreign exchange costs of war for 
a state which had not engaged in any significant fighting
except in defence of Mozambican provincial towns against
Rhodesian raids, totalled around $350 mn, or about a year's 
mid-1970s exports. Because earlier exports were lower, the 
running year by year average would be about seven and a half 
per cent.
Late lS78/mid-1982 war costs relate almost exclusively to
Uganda. The solidarity forces in Mozambique had to be
withdrawn to meet the invasion. Subsequent units sent on the 
request of the governments of the Seychelles (where they 
foiled che South African based 'rugby coup' attempt) and the
Comores (where Robert Denard's mercenaries toppled the rather 
eccentric government they sought to defend) were on a much 
smaller scale - in the low hundreds versus perhaps 5,000 
troops in Mozambique. However, the total costs were much 
higher than for any other period, and included more direct or 
first round dislocation effects.
Imported equipment to fight the war against Amin were of the 
order of $150 mn. Ultimately, of course, they destroyed ’ his 
regime, although the equipment purchases for recapturing 
•Kagera, knocking out the bases from which his forces struck 
and maintaining a border defence cordon would not have been 
much lower, and most orders were probably placed while these 
were the Tanzanian objectives. For the 225-250 odd days of 
real war (with an expeditionary force of up to 40 ,000) the 
foreign exchange operating costs were probably somewhat over 
$1 mn a day for a sub-total of the ordei of $375 mn.
Following the war, the armed forces were requested by four
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Consecutive Uganda governents to provide security and the 
"costs of training and provisioning Ugandan forces, anc these 
costs over 1979/82 were estimated at around S3 to 3.5 mn a 
month, almost all in foreign exchange terms (salaries were 
paid and spent in Uganda and staple food was being imported). 
This suggests a sub-total of $125 mn.
In addition, Uganda was provided with reconstruction loans - 
largely in exportables or imports - totalling $75 mn on 
Ugandan calculations as of the date of lending (much less now 
as they were denominated in Tanzania shillings). Furrr.er war 
damage to the northern part of Kagera region (and peripherally 
from Ugando-Libyan bombing of Bukoba and Mwanza), to roads and 
bridges caused by military traffic far beyond design capacity, 
including tracked vehicles, as well as to vehicles and 
dislocation of normal export and import substitute transport 
may, conservatively, have had a foreign exchange content of 
$75 mn - say about one third each.
This suggests a total foreign exchange cost of that war of the 
order of $650 mn or over one-third of 1979-82 exports. This 
compares fairly well with figures of $500 mn - not including 
Uganda support costs nor full war damage, although probably 
including some domestic cost component - suggested early on by 
the Tanzanian government. It is also broadly consistent with 
the (still-born) attempts in 1979 to: a) reschedule up to $100 
mn of war-related import finance; b) borrow $350 mn medium 
term to 'reschedule' war cost shock effects on import 
capacity; c) negotiate a $2.5 mn odd monthly Ugandan offset 
payment to Tanzanian costs of maintaii ing army units in Uganda 
at her government's request (which wo.Id have totalled around 
$75 mn by the mid-1982 final withdrawal) and d) to secure 
early repayment - in goods or cash - of the $75 mn of 
rehabilitation loans to Uganda - items which add up to $600 
mn.
Spill-over costs have not been estimated. They relate 
primarily to refugees, as lost Uganda transit traffic was 
always marginal. Because Tanzania has had large numbers of 
refugees from a series of countries - the Rwandaise and 
Burundian totals far exceeding the Ugandan - and has mobilised 
domestic and external resources to support or integrate them 
without major macroeconomic stress, the much smaller number of 
Ugandans probably did not add significantly to total war 
costs.
War costs in 1982/83 - 1986/87 have been substantially lower. 
Initially, arguably, they relate in part to problems of rapid 
demobilisation, but primarily their raison d'etre is the 
growing perception of a real threat - if not direcriy to 
Tanzania then certainly to her Front Line State neighbours and 
allies - from an increasingly aggressive Republic of South 
Africa. Following the mid-1986 upgrading of South African 
proxy force ('armed bandits', or by their own styling, 
Mozambique National Resistance - Renamo) invasions of
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Mozambique and a real if limited improvement in its own 
economic position Tanzania once again became deeply involved 
in the defence of Mozambique. It upgraded the ongoing
training of Mozambican forces which was never fully halted 
even in 1978-82 and probably on a rising trend thereafter.
More critically in expenditure terms, it restored provision of 
garrison troops (e.g. for Quelimane, Pemba) and joint 
operation forces (in Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nanpula, Zambesia
provinces) probably totalling perhaps 5,000 to 6,000.
The 1982/83 - 1986/87 (fiscal year) foreign exchar.ge costs are 
likely to be of the order of $175 mn for a cumulative late
1961 - mid-1987 total of the order of $1 , 200 mn. Their annual 
rate as of 1987 is probably of the order of $75-100 mn (well 
over half the defence budget). By comparison, by 1985 export 
earnings were $300 mn odd, external debt (including debt and 
commercial arrears) of the order of $4,500 mn, external debt 
service (positing 10 per cent arrears reduction) of the order 
of $350 mn and GDP around $4,000 mn.
Direct Human Costs
The direct human costs have been significantly lower in 
Tanzania than in most other SSA countries with heavy war 
bills. The basic reason is straightforward. There has not 
been protracted, large scale fighting in Tanzania. The 
largest has been 10,000 civilians massacred in the Kagera 
invasion. Other civilian deaths from incursions have probably 
totalled little over 100 (with 15 in a helicopter borne 
Burundi raid the bloodiest single case) although this may be 
an underestimate since the 'small' raid and landmine incidents 
on the (then) Portuguese border were not fully reported. As 
public sevices and food supplies did not break down over any 
large area or for extended periods, war associated civilian 
deaths - related primarily to lack of medical attention - may 
have been 500. Military casualties are hard to estimate - 
perhaps 100 in the minor border raids and incursions, 500 in 
solidarity missions (virtually all in Mozambique), 500 to
I,000 in Uganda (including transport fatalities). The total
II,750 - 12,500 is not small, but is not of the same order as 
in the Chadian, Nigerian, Ethiopian/Eritrean or Sudanese 
civil/separatist wars, nor the probable 1,000,000 souls who 
have died in Angola and Mozambique since 1980 as a result of 
the war South Africa has waged against their countries.
Damage to human welfare beyond that sketched above is 
basically indirect - the multiplier effect of foreign exchange 
costs of the overall Tanzanian economy. One possible
exception relates to the little researched 'defence villages' 
organised in the early and mid-1960s to safeguard peasants 
from Portuguese border incursions. These villages - almost 
all in Mtwara and Ruvuma regions - probably grouped 500,000 
people prior to the 1967/69 launching of the Ujamaa village 
programme under which they were subsumed. Very little,
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•however, is documented on their internal socio-political 
'structure, size, access to basic services or economic impact. 
On balance - especially given post 1970 marketed agricultural 
output growth and level of basic service access in these two 
regions - the net human impact of ‘defensive1 villagisation 
may well have been positive.
Refugees from Mozambique and Uganda were in general 
substantively less badly off than dislocated persons in 
Mozambique or Uganda. Their presence - within an ongoing 
Tanzanian tradition and programme of ‘hosting1 refugees as 
well as of a broader relationship with FRELIMO - does not 
appear to have imposed unmanageable macroeconomic costs on 
Tanzania, nor to have had a negative impact on the material 
condition of her people.
Macroeconomic Costs, Shocks and D istractions
The late 1961 - mid-1987 foreign exchange cost of war, in 
prices of the year in which it was incurred, has been
estimated above at $1, 200 m n . In terms of export prices on a 
comparable temporal basis that is equivalent to about five
years total exports, or almost 20 per cent of total export 
earnings since independence. As the incremental ratio of 
imports to GDP in Tanzania has probably averaged between 20
and 25 per cent this suggests a GDP loss of the order of 
$4,800 to $6,000 mn ($9,000 mn converted to 1986/87 prices) or 
in excess of (roughly twice) 1986 GDP. The calculation is 
bedevilled by the issue of appropriate exchange rates for
conversion since neither the official (after 1978) nor the 
parallel market one is particularly appropriate. On some 
calculations average import/GDP ratios were as low as 12.5 per 
cent in the 1983-84 period but the conversion problem means 
that these are downward biased.
However, these overall macro magnitudes may not be as 
revealing as they appear. Up to the Amin invasion, Tanzania's 
budgetary and external balances do not appear to have been
seriously undermined by war expenditure. Doubtless it 
constituted a drag, but - even in retrospect - probably not a 
major one. The basic fiscal and external position - with the 
exception of 1974/75 - was healthy, and the one exception was 
neither caused by, nor recovery from it evidently slowed, by
war costs. At $30-50 mn a year in the middle 1970s they were 
within national carrying capacity.
The period 1978-82 is quite another matter. The foreign 
exchange costs of war in that period (slightly under four
years) ran at over $150 mn annually or at least a third of 
export earnings. In the peak period, military spending 
appears to have accounted for over 25 per cent (versus a less 
abnormal 10 per cent and a nominal 'target' non-war level 
under 5 per cent) of total central government spending. The 
shock impact was severe - how severe is rarely recognised
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because of failure to pay serious attention to magnitudes and 
t rming.
The economic shock from war-spending over 1978-82 was 
comparable to terms of trade losses over those four years 
which averaged around ?200 mn a year (compared to 1976 
levels) . That from the 1979-84 bad weather cycle (following 
good weather in 1975-78) can hardly have averaged more than 
$25 mn a year over 1978-82, nor can the actual transitional 
costs of the 1977 breakup of the East African Community (EAC) .
In external accounts terms the shocks were both very severe - 
comparable to about 40 per cent of average imports and over 80 
per cent of average exports for the period - and lengthy (four 
years for war, six for drought and terms of trade worsening, 
perhaps four for initial EAC breakup/replacement costs vs two 
years for main terms of trade and drought shocks over 
1973-74). In total they were unmanageable, while without the 
war (or terms of trade) component they would arguably have 
been just manageable.
In addition to raising shock levels, war distracted and 
detracted from capacity to manage them. The middle of a war 
is not a time at which either medium term stabilisation and 
adjustment policy can be adopted or in which government 
economic management efficiency is likely to receive priority 
attention. The war is - necessarily - the central strategic 
and policy issue; efficiency within government is forced out 
of centre stage; debate on cost efficiency by the armed forces 
is virtually halted even if it did, as in Tanzania, have a 
certain degree of effectiveness before.
These costs are very clear when 1974/75 and 1978/79 Tanzanian 
responses to economic crises are contrasted. The main 
stabilisation, financing and revival strategy that was used to 
ride out and recover from 1973/74 shocks was basically 
formulated in the first two months of 1974, adopted within 
four and in place within six. The 1974/75 fiscal, domestic 
bank credit creation/allocation, and foreign exchange budgets 
were integral parts of that strategy.
No such speedy response was achieved in 1978/79 precisely 
because of the war. The first semi-coherent strategic 
response pattern was not drawn up until mid-1980. Fiscal 
control, especially, but not only, over military expenditure, 
■was not regained until 1981. Broadly speaking, domestic bank 
credit creation and allocation did not come under coherent 
control until 1981/82, and the foreign exchange budgeting 
process (perhaps because too much shock damage had been done 
before the first serious - but in the event unrealistic - 
reconstruction efforts were made in mid-1980 and mid-1981) 
never regained its 1972/75 level of performance.
Until mid-1979 this lagged and inadequate performance - like 
the failure to discover the shambles that had evolved
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^physically and financially) in the agricultural parastatals - 
was primarily a cost of focusing on the war and uncertainties 
as to its length and costs. Thereafter, the costs were those 
of starting late when a downward spiral had attained momentum 
and Tanzanian economic and fiscal management had lost control 
at home and credibility abroad - admittedly partly because of 
fiscal and foreign exchange management laxity over 1977-79 
having little to do with the war, but exacerbated by it. The 
first increased both the costs and duration of stabilisation 
(at the most optimistic reckoning not acheived until 1983/84), 
restructuring (not achieved as of 1987) and recovery (perhaps 
begun in 1986) and the second - until at the earliest 1986/87 
- made it impossible to secure adequate initial external 
resources to initiate and/or sustain them.
The 1982-87 war costs have been at much lower annual levels. 
Had the economy been in an otherwise healthy condition, they 
would probably have proven manageable. In the event they 
represented one more drag on stabilisation and, especially, 
recovery. At the same time, the economic debilitation reduced 
spending to deter external aggression below prudent levels 
(even if it is imprudent to articulate how and where) and 
clearly delayed the restoration of the forces acting in 
solidarity with Mozambique's struggle against external 
aggression until late 1986. That restoration was made urgent 
by the stepping up of South Africa's destructive engagement 
against Mozambique, but to some extent was also influenced by 
the improvement in economic conditions in the second half of 
1986 .
The indirect human costs of war bills in the case of Tanzania 
are very indirect and flow from the impact of macroeconomic 
constraints on - especially - health, education, water and 
real wages. These are significant as evidenced by the slowing 
down of decreases in infant mortality and rises in 
malnutr ition.
It would be quite unreasonable to set up a 1981-86 
counter factual (without the war shock) of five to six per cent 
annual GDP growth (like 1975-76). The levels and duration of 
the other shocks, plus imprudent 1977-79 fiscal, credit and 
foreign exchange policies would have prevented that. But 
earlier adjustment to smaller shocks probably would have at 
least held 1978-81 real output constant to slowing rising, 
allowed a return to three to four per cent growth over 
1982-86, facilitated reaching 1986-type Bank/bilateral 
resource flow agreements that held up by 1979 or 1980, and 
allowed the 1981 strategic concentration on exports to be 
articulated, sustained and productive (as opposed to a rough, 
unsustainable burst, yielding substantial volume gains only in 
its first year). Since this implies a 1986 GDP 20 per cent 
above that actually achieved it strongly suggests that to 
evaluate Tanzania's 1978-86 performance without reference to 
war costs is seriously incomplete. The foreign exchange cost 
(excluding export declines from resource reallocations which
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limited production, processing, transport and investment) is 
of the same order of magnitude as that from 1972-86 net terms 
ot trade losses ana very far above 1973—74 plus 1979—84 
drought related foreign exchange bills. Yet these exogenous 
shocks are nearly universally accepted as requiring sectoral 
and macro analytical attention and indeed receive it. War and 
the war bill do not.
Strategy, Goals_and _Results
The estimation of costs is not intended to imply that the 
military strategy was in general ill chosen, unable to meet 
its minimum objectives or evidently substitutable for by less 
costly means. In most cases quite the contrary.
1. The deterrence of invasion/minimisation of incursion goal 
was achieved except for Uganda, in 1974. In the absence 
of credible Tanzanian forces it is likely that 
Portuguese, Zairean element, Burundian, and Ugandan 
incursions and Rhodesian sabotage raids would have been 
more numerous and costly. There might also have been 
direct Malawian intervention at some point during the 
water border dispute (on Lake Nyassa-Malawi-Niassa) . 
Certainly the 1972 Ugandan probing invasion would have 
proceeded had its point tank column not been knocked out 
at the border.
2. The 1978-79 war achieved its immediate objectives. 
Amin's forces were contained and repelled and their 
attack bases destroyed. Support for Uganda's liberation 
struggle against Amin led directly to his overthrow 
(probably not an initial Tanzanian goal but one forced by 
Tanzanian public opinion and Amin's only too credible 
threats to kill all those who had welcomed Tanzanian 
troops entering Uganda to destroy the bases from which 
the invasion into Kagera had been launched). No 
subsequent Uganda regime has posed a military or 
strategic threat to Tanzania. The massive use of 
artillery to blast troops out of defensive positions (in 
the later stages of the war virtually preventing any 
sustained resistance) did raise financial costs. But it 
greatly reduced loss of Tanzanian lives as well as those 
of Ugandan civilians and - except in the first few weeks 
- Ugandan property. Kampala, for example, was recovered 
nearly intact after a two-day barrage focused on the golf 
course led to the flight of the remaining Libyan forces 
and Nubian mercenaries fighting for Amin. Equally the 
alternatives - acquiescing in Uganda's annexation of 
Northern Kagera or repulsing the invasion, hitting bases 
but leaving Amin in power - would probably in the end 
have cost more in terms of permanently higher required 
defence levels than did the 'one off' war.
37
However, the costs of supporting restoration of 
legitimate rule and stability in Uganda clearly did not 
achieve their goal. The semi-stability lasted little 
longer than their presence. This was not true in
prospect and need not have been in retrospect had the UPC 
(Uganda People's Congress) chosen to form a unity 
government with the DP (Democratic Party) after the 1980 
elections. One can argue that the failure of Tanzanian 
diplomacy to achieve that goal, rather than the size, 
duration or actions of the military units, was the cause 
of the failure of the stabilisation support force to 
achieve its lasting objective.
The 1975-78 solidarity forces in Mozambique appear to
have achieved their minimum objective. Raids by Smitu 
forces (and by Renamo, then a Rhodesian proxy) on 
Mozambican towns were sharply reduced after several 
bloody receptions. Mozambican forces were freed for 
active use in rural areas. In the Seychelles, the
Tanzanian contingent prevented at least two foreign-based 
coup attempts and successfully worked themselves out of a 
job. The Comoros exercise was clearly not a success - 
the government asking for Tanzanian support was 
overthrown by a mercenary invasion despite their
presence. The ongoing solidarity campaign with
Mozambique cannot yet be evaluated in terms of results. 
To date it has released Mozambican troops from garrison 
duty and mounted several successful joint operations, but 
the military situation remains problematic. It should be 
noted that the installation of a South African puppet 
(Renamo) government in all of the northern provinces of 
Mozambique, or the emergence of bandit anarchy over the 
same area would entail high defence costs to Tanzania to 
prevent it from spilling over via border incursions, and 
would result ir. substantial costs in respect to probably 
scores of thousands of refugees.
That the results could have been achieved at lower cost 
by optimum armed forces equipment choice, physical and 
logistical management and financial - accounting 
purchasing procedures is in principle and at micro level 
undeniable. Whether significant savings could actually 
have been made (especially during the 1978-79 war period) 
and how is very much less clear. Cost efficiency is not, 
it would appear, a characteristic of any armed force, and 
it is by no means evident that Tanzania has a worse than 
average record. The Tanzania Treasury's ability to limit 
military spending has in most periods been quite real - 
the exceptions: a) 1976-79 war; b) 1986-87 restoration of 
7 solidarity force operations in Mozambique when military 
collapse there seemed a real and imminent threat are the 
type of context in which no Treasury is (or perhaps 
should be) able to prevent sharp increases in military 
spend ing.
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Strategic cost evaluations in prospect are highly speculative 
- not least when conducted by government or other economists 
and financial analysts. For example, the Morogoro Airbase/jet 
squadron acquisition and armour/artillery build-up of the late 
1960s and early 1970s were queried by some Tanzanian officials 
on the grounds of cost inefficiency (or literally irrelevance 
to any Tanzanian military needs). In the event this criticism 
proved ill-founded. Whatever its limitations, the Tanzanian 
airforce relatively quickly drove the Ugandans out of 
Tanzanian skies and off the backs of Tanzanian forces during 
the invasion/liberation of Uganda. The tanks spearheaded 
several advances, including the skirmishes leading to the 
capture of Entebbe and Kampala. The artillery was integral to 
the low human cost strategy of blasting or frightening the 
Amin forces out of entrenched positions and minimising the 
need for hand to hand combat or infantry charges. As opposed 
to a less sophisticated hand-to-hand or machine gun-to-machine 
gun war there *as less physical damage (at least after the 
Mbarara and Masaka pitched battles), less civilians killed or 
wounded and both less and briefer dislocations for most. None 
of that should be taken to imply Ugandan civilians were 
unaffected or only slightly affected by the fighting. The 
point is that alternative Tanzanian war strategies would have 
raised the costs to civilian Ugandans.
A Counter factual (very) Rough Estimate
The direct foreign exchange cost of war to Tanzania of $1,200 
mn suggests a direct non-military GDP loss of $4,800 to $6,000 
mn, or about one year's GDP. The additional military GDP - 
basically salaries and wages - can hardly have been over $500 
mn and, while necessary, was not desired. Given the shock and 
policy lag results, that range is a minimum estimate and is in 
fact too low, as it would imply very low post-1982 GDP losses
directly or indirectly related to war.
The $4,800-6,000 mn is aggregated at current prices and 
exchange rates of the years in which it was incurred. 
Converting to 1986 prices and exchange rates might give a 
current price loss of at least $8,000-10, 000 mn or of the 
order of twice 1986 GDP. This is not to argue that 1986 GDP 
would have been three times as high without the war costs.
Most reduced private and public consumption in the year in 
which they were incurred or (via initial short term import
finance constraining subsequent imports) with a lag. Only a 
rather smaller proportion reduced fixed investment and export 
base thus reducing 1986 capacity and capacity utilisation - 
and therefore GDP.
Alternatively one could assume in the absence of the Amin war 
and its aftermath:
a) development of a crisis management stragegy (including
parastatal reform and tightened fiscal policy) in the
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first quarter of 1979;
b) successful negotiation of a programme loan package with 
the World Bank and consequential programmes with 
bilateral sources by the end of 1979;
c) more as a condition for b) than as a source of finance, 
an IMF agreement going marginally into the second credit 
tranche by mid 1979 (but fully retired by 1986);
d) adoption of an inflation offsetting, frequent, marginal 
exchange rate adjustment policy (and a basket not 
overloaded in 'favour' of the US dollar) by the end of 
1980 when the trend appreciation of the dollar had become 
clear;
e) the arrears and supplier credit overhang build-up would 
have been averted or contained.
On that basis, instead of declining by a total of four to five 
per cent from 1978 through 1982, constant price GDP might have 
stagnated in 1979 and risen on average two per cent a year 
over 1980-82 for a counter factual 1982 GDP 10 per cent above 
that actually attained. Instead of a growth total of eight to 
nine per cent over 1983-86 it could probably have risen three 
and a half to four per cent a year. In that event 1986 GDP 
would have been of the order of 20 per cent above projected 
actual 1986 and 25 per cent (vs 5 per cent actual) above 1978, 
more or less parallelling population growth. The cumulative 
GDP loss on this basis over 1979-86 was of the order of $4,800 
to $6 , 000 mn in recurrent and $6 , 750 to $9, 000 mn in 1985 
prices. Moreover, this is an interim and incomplete figure. 
No matter how rapid, 1987-90 recovery can hardly make good a 
20 per cent starting loss of output. In addition it takes no 
account of export and concessional financial flow losses. 
(Tanzania had little or no soft procurement finance). Export 
levels would probably have grown modestly from 1981's export 
rehabilitation strategy levels instead of falling 20 per cent. 
Thus 1985 export earnings would have been of the order of $450 
mn (vs $300 mn) and the cumulative additional exports over
1982-86, $500-600 mn. In addition, the earlier negotiation of 
a World Bank backed rehabilitation (structural adjustment) 
programme and a Paris Club debt rescheduling exercise would 
have increased net external resource transfers (which fell 
markedly after 1980) by about the same amount. This means 
that added earnings and inflows would have totalled 
$1,000-1,200 mn. If that had been the case it is reasonable 
to assume that arrears would have been avoided (always a 
policy goal even if one which proved increasingly 
unattainable), IMF drawings (excluding Trust Fund) reduced to 
nil versus $50 mn odd, and external foreign exchange reserves 
increased/Bank of Tanzania commercial bank credits cut by 
$50-25Omn. This is a conservative assumption of use but one 
in line with previous Tanzanian practice: avoiding arrears
(none to 1979), repaying IMF drawings as fast as possible,
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holding three months (say $250 mn) foreign exchange reserves).
The human cost is even harder to estimate. Infant and under 
five mortality rates, after falling rapidly from the early 
1960s to the late 1970s, appear to have stagnated around 185 
per 1000 live births - at least through 1984. Had funding to 
maintain and build up primary nealth care and pure water been 
available, it is reasonable to assume that the decline would 
have continued and the 1984-86 level been at most about 150. 
If that is the case, excess under five deaths in 1986 could 
have been around 30,000-32,500, and the cumulative 1979-86 
loss of infant and child lives 125,000-145,000. Adding the
Kagera massacre and combat related deaths (12,500) and loss of
older children and adult, lives from deteriorated or not 
improved access to health and pure water, (25,000 - 30,000)
would raise the total to 162,500-187,500.
Similarly, both in respect to real incomes (especially of wage 
and urban informal earners) and of basic health, education and 
water services (especially to rural and outlying small town 
dwellers) the indirect costs of the war represented by the 
potential GDP loss have been high. The number in or just 
above absolute poverty, instead of declining (as it did from 
1967 through 1978, with the probable exception of 1974/75) has 
risen. What the difference is as of 1986 is very hard to 
estimate, but 2,500,000 - 3,250,000 (10 to 15 per cent of the 
total population) may be a resonable guesstimate.
Even though Tanzania has not had a civil war nor fought a 
major war on its own soil, the direct and indirect impact of 
war since 1978 has been 'killing the dream'. As of 1978, 
universal access to basic education, health, pure water, 
125-150 infant and under five mortality rates, 60-year life 
expectancy, elimination of severe malnutrition and reduction 
of the proportion of Tanzanians living in absolute poverty to 
under one quarter were reasonaole dreams and basic national 
goals backed by priority allocation of resources. In 1986 
Tanzania is further from achieving them than in 1978, even 
though they remain objectives and still have priority in 
allocating shrunken resources. Certainly external
environmental hostility (terms of trade and drought) and 
domestic economic management sloppiness (partly itself the 
result of too sharply increased a level of challenges) played 
a part, but without the costs of the Amin war the 1978-86 
direction of change could still nave been upward.
V
SOME POLITICAL ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
Given the macroeconomic magnitude of war in many SSA 
economies, it appears unsound not to give it specific, 
detailed attention as it would be to pass over major droughts
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•or terms of trade shifts as minor passing aberrations which 
- could be ignored, treated as afterthoughts or safely 'ridden 
out'. That way lies theoretical error and applied disaster. 
Yet that is exactly the way economic analysis and, very often, 
political economic strategy, planning, policy and programming 
does proceed nationally in SSA and by bilateral and 
multilateral development agencies. Dragons really do lie in 
wait for the traveller down that path.
Serious estimates of probable war-related expenditure broken 
down by scarce resources required are a necessary input into 
medium term national planning and into annual macro and 
sectoral budgeting exercises. Similarly, economic policies 
and prpjects need to be viewed in terms of their vulnerability 
in respect to potential hostilities, e.g. the Sudan oilfield 
development was always a dangerous venture without a stable 
benefit-sharing agreement with the South, and Mozambique's 
concentration of domestic and foreign resources on 
rehabilitating tea estates isolated far inland in Zambesia 
province and palpably vulnerable to armed bandit raids (which 
have now wrecked nearly all of them, despite energetic defence 
efforts by worker militias in several cases) in retrospect 
appears to have been very absent-minded, very reckless or 
both. The history of external financial commitments to the 
Limpopo Valley (Maputo-Zimbabwe) corridor also illustrates 
this point. They were initially made without serious 
consideration of whether it was likely to be attacked or, in 
that event, whether it could and would be defended effectively 
enough to remain functional. In none of these cases do the 
economic decision-takers and - especially - technocrats and 
external aid/finance bodies appear to have considered war risk 
factors, nor did military decision-takers and technical 
officers consider the specific defence possibilities (or 
impossibilities) of these projects separately, let alone with 
the economic and military sides conferring together. It is 
doubtless not aid agency business to become operational 
geostrategic or military experts let alone to become active 
parties to wars. They may not be able to avoid the latter, 
e.g. in Mozambique rebuilding transport is a hostile act from 
a South African pespective and not to do so is a hostile act 
from a Mozambican. But it is very much their business to 
consider not unlikely exogenous shock's effects on probable 
project or programme viability and to take into consideration 
the costs and levels of maintenance likely to be necessary and 
(which may be a quite different thing) forthcoming. This is 
as true of war as of floods, terms of trade, cargo diversion 
for economic reasons, drought or general shortages of 
maintenance personal and material/fi nanea 1 resources.
To fight for development on the economic front without 
reference to the military is likely at best to be highly 
inefficient in terms of avoidable investment destruction and 
production dislocation, and at worst to be a rapid way of 
killing the dream of economic recovery. To fight for security 
on the military front without coherent knowledge of key
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economic installations and prioritised defence for them is, at 
•he least, sure to cause avoidable losses of export and state 
revenue urgently needed to meet war costs, and at worst to 
allow the economy to be shattered even though the armed forces 
(until supplies run out) are rarely defeated in combat. Such 
uncoordinated tactics on the two fronts are ideally suited to 
achieving defeat on both.
The issues posed above are neither simple, easy to resolve nor 
given to yielding wholly unproblematic answers. For example, 
anyone with a working knowledge of Southern African transport 
systems and external trade volumes can identify reopening the 
Maputo-Chicualacuala rail line to Zimbabwe as a one-off 
technical solution to the central landlocked states (Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, Botswana) fully escaping from dependence on South 
African routes, even if the Beira and Dar corridors remained 
at their present capacity. Little more technical knowledge 
(and no secret information) is required to know that Maputo 
harbour could handle the traffic; that the technical task of 
rail rehabilitation is relatively straightforward and could - 
war permitting - be carried out in 8 to 12 months, and that 
substantial sums are committed by external sources to 
rehabilitation of the line and to rehabilitation plus 
replacement of rolling stock, including locomotives.
'War permitting' are the key words without which economic 
analysts and transport technicians are unlikely to be able to 
form a sound judgement. The line for extended distances on 
both sides of the Z imbabwe-Mozambique border runs near the 
South African frontier, i.e. it is ideally placed for MNR or 
South African hit and run raids. Further, both in the 
documents captured at the Ngorongoza MNR base and in revealed 
preference (the greatest intensity and continuity of MNR 
attacks in Southern Mozambique have been devoted to keeping 
the line virtually or totally closed for four years) South 
Africa has clearly expressed its priority for keeping the line 
closed and its willingness to wage at least proxy and sabotage 
war to do so. The bottom line question is whether, in the 
context of the total demands on them, the Zimbabwean and 
Mozambican armed forces can allocate the personnel, equipment 
and funds to protect the line during rehabilitation and 
operation. Equally, the reason for posing that question to 
them is that technically, economically and in terms of 
vulnerability reduction, reopening the line is a top priority.
This example has been chosen because it is important, 
well-known and widely believed to be under discussion among 
Zimbabwean and Mozambican senior transport arid security 
personnel. The only secret is what decision or what 
postponement of a final decision will be taken on what time 
scale. It would require remarkable obtuseness on South 
Africa's part not to be able to identify the issues posed and, 
indeed, not to have drawn up contingency plans of some type 
and within some limits on what action it would take via its 
proxy forces and/or directly to abort or cut short reopening.
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The secret on that side is how high an escalation and how open 
and undeniable a use of the South African armed forces (e.g. 
ground or helicopter borne sabotage parties? Long range 
howitzers? Jet aircraft strikes?) it is prepared to use in 
any such attempt to keep the Chicualacuala line closed.
Wars and war cost are exogenous shocks. To say it is 
desirable to avoid them is true but either trite or an entry 
into an area of analysis not much illuminated by 
macroeconomics. To say that given any actual level of war 
costs and any contextual reality or probability of war it is 
important to minimise specific and overall shocks is more 
relevant to economic policy making. This is the point of 
seeking to know probable resource allocations required by war 
in advance in order to budget for them. It is equally one 
basic reason for integrating strategies in respect to the 
military and economic fronts of war.
Shock reduction is of very nigh political economic priority in 
SSA. Most economies and most polities are fragile and a 
majority are debilitated by their experiences since 1979. Any 
additional shock may set off a chain reaction toward
disintegration that would not occur were they less fragile and 
less debilitated. Even if it does not, resilience is low so 
that clawing back the damage done is likely to be slow, unlike 
Europe over 1945-1950. In the context of structural
adjustment shocks raise short term costs, reduce or postpone 
benefits and increase the strain on what are usually (by
national and World Bank estimates) significantly underfunded 
programmes. It would be fatuous to say that the cost of
defence against Rhodesia and South Africa was the immediate 
primary cause of the collapse of Zambia's 1984 and 1985-87 
structural adjustment programmes. It is not at all
unreasonable to argue that those costs had debilitated both 
the economy and the polity and that failing to take them into 
account helped lead to over-commitments and under-performances 
which were more than marginal in making the programmes 
unsusta inable.
Conundrums of Projection and Containment
War costs are perceived to be notoriously difficult to project 
or to control. Up to a point this is true, but so are drought 
and terms of trade shifts. That is no reason for not trying. 
Nor, in the event of major unpredicted cost increases, is it 
an excuse for failing to conduct a reassessment of macro and 
sectoral economic strategy and policy, rather than just 
jotting in the new costs and/or reduced revenues and doing 
little more. That is hardly even effective crisis management, 
much less flexible medium term planning and programming. In 
extreme cases (on drought and terms of trade as well as war) 
it looks rather more like sleepwalking toward a cliff.
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Certain rules of thumb are possible. War cost levels - in the 
absence of hard evidence and demonstrable trends to the 
contrary - should rarely be projected as falling in real 
terms. In five year and annual plans a substantial 
contingency line (for all unexpected costs, not least war) 
should be included. Similarly the projections should be 
systematically updated as trends, levels and likely 
contingencies alter. These rules of thumb are deliberately 
cautious - it is hard to deal with unpredicted cloudbursts 
with no contingency reserves to hand, but it is relatively 
easy to adjust to utilise rainbows with geld at their end. 
Unfortunately, economic experience over the past quarter 
decade in SSA also suggests that it is much more frequently 
necessary to face the first than the second.
War costs are harder than most to control. The combination of 
highly specialised technical knowledge and the need to keep 
substantial portions of contingency plan strategy and tactics 
secret does have that result.
However, strategy in broad outline is often deducible from 
publicly known and unconcealable facts, e.g. the Tanzanian 
airforce and armour build-up combined with very light defence 
of the immediate Uganda border area strongly suggested a 
strategy involving no Tanzanian opening of hostilities, 
defence in depth, at least neutralising the Uganda airforce, 
and a major counter-attack to and probably beyond the border 
spearheaded by armour and covered by artillery barrages - a 
correct reading as it happens, though apparently not the one 
Amin or his fieId officers made. Therefore confidential 
discussions of military resource requirements in the context 
of broad strategies among senior military, finance and 
relevant sector ministries (e.g. transport) are likely to be 
possible and to raise cost efficiency without reducing 
secur ity.
This will not eliminate shocks, e.g. in 1980 Tanzania suddenly 
found itself forced to feed the bulk of the Uganda army as the 
Tanzanian forces commander found the Uganda government was 
unable or unwilling to do so, and neither he nor the Tanzania 
Treasury was willing to answer for the probable consequences 
of fed and unfed armed units side by side, or indeed for the 
actions of an unfed national army in a country in respect to 
which Tanzania had accepted a security responsibility. 
Similarly, military procurement and accounting - in time of 
peace but ever, more during war - even when competent in its 
own terms, does place abnormally high priority on speed, 
safety margins and technical certainty, and abnormally low 
emphasis on minimum cost attainment of set targets. Those 
characteristics appear to be global and at best containable, 
not erad icable. However, in that regard the military are an 
extreme technical ministry case not a unique one - health, for 
example, often exhibits the same characteristics.
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War As Context For Policy
Finally war - or high war-related costs more generally - is a 
context different from peace. Normal peacetime targets, 
priorities and phasings, as well as the possible meaning of 
policy instruments, need to be reconsidered in that context.
Frequently this is not done, or at least not done 
systematically. The IMF, the World Bank and bilateral donors 
are particularly prone to this oversight. One reason for this 
is the desire to appear apolitical and to avoid interfering 
with military tactics and budgets. Up to a point that is 
doubtless correct, but it is not adequate if it leads to 
avoidance of taking the actual war cost context into account 
in assessing macro and sectoral (and indeed project) strategy 
and policy, let alone in framing viable stabilisation or
structural adjustment programmes.
A few examples may be illustrative. Very few countries 
anywhere have consistently maintained balanced budgets under 
war conditions. Nor in industrial economies has it usually
been contended that such action was generally possible, or 
even desirable.
The argument has been that war costs should be spread over a 
period of time (an argument analagous to that for phased 
stabilisation and adjustment with higher interim levels of 
external resource transfers). In respect to real costs this 
must mean lowering new fixed investment and maintenance or 
deferring replacement of part of the existing capital stock
and/or increasing net external resource inflows. Domestic 
borrowing to finance the war effort can also have the same
effect if it actually raises real savings rates and thus 
defers part of normal consumption demand. Forced money 
creation can - via inflation - reduce effective non-military 
demand, but unless linked to rationing of essential items 
which are then sold at fixed (whether or not subsidised) 
prices, a disproportionate portion of the burden is likely to 
fall on the poor and vulnerable.
If these principles applied to the British and USA economies
during World War II, it is hard to see why they do not apply
to, e.g. Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, whose domestic bank and 
quasi-bank borrowing requirement is dominated by war costs,
and Tanzania. The point is not that budgetary and external 
balance are irrelevant during a war or recovery from a war - 
far from it. It is that the means, sequences, instruments and 
phasing may need alteration.
Similarly price - including exchange rate - policies need 
reconsideration in a war context. What do they mean? What
can they achieve? For example, official grower prices for 
domestic food are usually irrelevant in SSA (because 
by-passed) if substantially below market clearing prices. War 
is likely to result in precisely that situation unless the
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crops are purchased on a quasi-barter basis with parallel 
sales (also at official prices) of goods farmers want. 
Mozambique has tried that route, admittedly with limited 
succcess, first, because the import capacity for production 
inputs or final consumer goods were and are lacking, and 
second, because war had disrupted and continues to disrupt 
transport, so that getting goods in or crops out was often 
literally impossible. Prices will not substitute for goods to 
buy with crop proceeds, for transport, or for security to 
produce crops.
The oddity of normal exchange rate analysis during a war is 
starkly illustrated by Mozambique. The bottom lines of the 
external balance crisis are that about 80 per cent of 
'peacetime' (1978-80 growth trend projection) visible and 
invisible exports have been cut off by war, and that military 
import requirements probably exceed total actual export
earnings. In this context talk of an equilibrium exchange 
rate is surrealistic.
Again this is not to say that exchange rate - like other price 
- adjustments are pointless. Mozambique was probably wise to 
devalue for four reasons:
1. the adjustment in itself kept the fact that there was a 
serious price problem in this area on the agenda;
2. building up huge discrepancies from any plausible
post-war exchange rate is building an unnecessary barrier 
to post-war reconstruction. Movement toward such a rate 
- which is probably far from the parallel market rate of 
MM 1 , 500 or 900 to the US $ (depending on whether one 
uses the direct ? rate or the Rand cross rate) but is 
clearly not MM 40 to the $ (the pre-devaluation rate) and 
is probably above the present MM 200 to the $ - is
desirable even if its exact level is unknowable. As
present Mozambique inflation rates are likely to cancel 
out much of the devaluation relatively rapidly, a process 
of small, excess inflation offsetting adjustments (as in 
Z imbabwe and Tanzania) would also appear prudent;
3. raising the cost of officially imported and allocated 
goods (and taxes on them) is likely to reduce unintended 
windfall rents to non-priority enterprises and 
individuals and to augment state revenue;
4. re-sold (monetised) commodity aid should now 
substantially reduce the domestic budgetary gap even 
after the wage and salary increases adopted at the same 
time.
Parallel questions arise about rationing. It is normally seen 
as appropriate for disaster relief and for programmes as 
varied as Indian food for work and the USA food stamp scheme. 
Therefore, its use under wartime conditions in SSA (as in the
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UK and USA during World War II) seems logically unassailable 
if viable allocational, distributional and price/cost 
relationship procedures can be devised and implemented.
All of these points bear a family resemblance to those 
accepted in principle - and to a degree in practice - for
other major exogenous shock contexts, e.g. terms of trade
shifts, droughts. Neither in those cases nor in war is there 
any implication that causation largely beyond national control 
somehow frees a country from the need to respond and to 
adjust. It does not. The questions are how, how fast, with
what limits, under what constraints?
In Summary - 'A Lutta Continua'
At least ten substantial conclusions can be drawn from the 
preceeding tour d'horizon and m.ini-case study.
First, war is of substantial (negative) political economic 
importance in SSA and in a significant number of SSA economies 
both at the macroeconomic and human condition levels.
Second, the macroeconomic and human condition implications of 
war/war costs have been the subject of very little systematic 
description, let alone analysis, with the recent and partial 
exception of Southern Africa.
Third, war for political economic analytic purposes includes 
civil wars, external wars, solidarity/mutual defence forces, 
precautionary or deterrent expenditure to ward off or contain 
wars above 'normal' defence levels. Military coups and 
domestic repression - unless they turn into civil wars - are 
for this purpose probably best excluded.
Four th, macroeconomic costs include direct military spending 
(both financial and foreign exchange), direct war damage, 
costs of deterrence or contingency defence, spill-over costs 
of adjacent wars and of solidarity forces and the multiplier 
(divider) effect of the autonomous changes (withdrawals of 
scarce resources) on the overall economy.
Fifth, human costs include direct combat deaths (military and 
civilian), increased mortality - especially among infants and 
small children - as a result of war or war cost disruption of 
health and related services, starvation resulting from combat 
and dislocation impact on food production and distribution, 
non-lethal misery and poverty costs of mass dislocation, 
poverty increasing impact of divider effect on overall 
economy.
Sixth, the orders of magnitude of both the macroeconomic and 
human costs are very high in several cases - not only in 
Mozambique and Angola where they have been previously studied. 
Even in the case of Tanzania the total GDP loss is of the
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order of at least a year's output, the negative shock effect 
over 1978-82 (the years of the Uganda war and its aftermath) 
comparable to that of terms of trade collapse and the loss of 
life (dominant:ly from inability to maintain primary health 
care for mothers, infants and young children) of the order of
140,000. The most severely affected independent countries are 
Mozambique, Angola, Chad, Sahara Democratic Republic, 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi 
and at least historically - Nigeria, Zaire, Somalia and Guinea 
de Sao.
Seventh, these macroeconomic magnitudes, together with their 
initial shock and post-war lag effects, are such as to require 
their specific consideration in macro and sectoral economic 
analysis and its application to decision taking and in 
particular to medium term strategy including stabilisation, 
rehabilitation, structural adjustment and recovery.
Eighth, the human costs - especially 'excess' infant and young 
child mortality and mass dislocation - are so appallingly high 
as to demand specific programmatic attention to their 
reduction both during and after the period of combat/maximum 
direct war costs.
N inth, to fight the military and economic fronts of war 
separately is a route to losing both - selection of neither 
economic nor of military priorities should be taken without 
reference to the opportunities provided and constraints 
imposed by the other discipline; a principle by po means 
always understood or applied.
Tenth, the human and macroeconomic costs of war - and of 
failing to recognise, to analyse and to take them into account 
in strategy and policy, selection of priorities and sequences, 
application of instruments and time frames is quite literally 
killing the dream of development - of liberation, of a better 
life, of peace, of access to basic health, education, food, 
shelter and clothing - for scores of millions of human beings 
in over a dozen sub-Saharan African independent states (as 
well as in occupied Namibia and the Republic of South Africa).
'A lutta continua' - the struggle continues. This is - 
regrettably or even damnably but also realistically - true for 
war costs in many SSA economies. Of the most severely 
affected states (Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Chad, Sahara 
Democratic Republic, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia, Malawi) only Chad and perhaps Uganda have realistic 
prospects of significant cost reduction in the foreseeable 
future.
More positively the struggle needs to continue to understand 
the political and human economic costs of war in SSA and in 
specific states more clearly, in greater detail and in more 
eonomic process related and dynamic terms. Progress in that 
struggle is important to informing and increasing the
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efficiency of efforts to develop appropriate political and 
human economic strategies, policies, programmes and projects 
to contain costs and facilitate recovery and to relate these 
to the military front of the wars. One must hope that the 
second line of the Lusophone African liberation movements - 
'Vittoria e certe' (victory is certain) - is applicable to 
these struggles.
What is certain is that if this intellectual and economic 
struggle is not waged and won, the chances of winning the 
military one, and of restoring peace, will be lower, and war 
will continue to kill the dream.
50
Annex
Military Governments and Wars: What Interaction?
At least in SSA, wars do not automatically lead to military 
governments. Nor do military governments necessarily lead to 
war .
This is true even in the case of states bcrn out of armed 
liberation struggles. Angola and Zimbabwe have had civilian 
governments despite both emerging from armed struggle and 
facing external intervention repeatedly since. Mozambique has 
had two elections since independence and while President 
Machel was a military commander, his predecessor - President 
Mondlane - and successor - President Chissanc were civilians, 
as are a substantial majority of the Party leadership and 
cabinet,
In the cases of Chad and the Sudan it is reasonably clear that 
the strains and costs of unresolved civil war led to military 
rule. On the other hand the military governments in their 
turn fell in large part because they could not resolve the 
civil wars, so that the Sudan has an elected civilian 
government and the present Chad leadership is not military in 
the normal sense of the word, although its authority rests 
largely on the credibility of its armed forces.
In Uganda it is arguable that the tensions ir. Buganda - which 
had erupted in violence - and the rumbling of civilian coup 
efforts paved the way for Amin's seizure of cower. Certainly 
his regime's conduct guaranteed civil war a 1'out ranee as more 
and more Ugandans turned against him until, at the end, only a 
small group of 'marked men' plus Nubian mercenaries and a 
Libyan expeditionary force stood with him. In the case of 
Nigeria it is arguable that the self-destructive nature of the 
civilian political process - especially its raising of 
tensions likely to explode into massive violence - caused both 
military coups against civilian regimes. On the other hand it 
is also arguable that the war of Biafran secession (or at one 
stage secession and conquest) would have been less inevitable 
under a civilian regime.
Zaire is a clear case of military seizure of power in the 
context of a multi-faceted de facto civil war among civilian 
fractions plus a secessionist war. Whether the regime has 
remained purely military is arguable (its dominant power base 
clearly is fractions of the armed forces). In any event it 
has not resolved the levels of discontent, including 
regionalism, which gave it the opportunity to seize power and 
has barely kept the lid on them while embroiling itself in a 
cold - and occasionally hot - state of hostility with Angola. 
In Ghana pe r contra, the current (PNDC) government led by 
Lieutenant Rawlings came to power not in the context of actual 
(or probably even potential) civil wars but of widespread
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^disgust with first military and then civilian regimes which
< were basically self-destructive. On the first occasion it ran 
a very brief clean-up campaign and electoral process 
safeguarding operation before handing over to the civilian 
winners, and in the present case it moved very rapidly to 
transform itself into what is - despite its origins and the 
lack, to date, of any formal civilian validation process - 
basically a civilian government.
External threats and defence/deterrence against them do not 
appear to lead to - nor result from - military governments. 
Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Tanzania do not 
have military governments. Ethiopia-Somalia tensions and 
initial clashes predate the government of President Mengistu, 
nor do they appear to have been the primary cause, much less 
occasion, of the revolt by which it secured power.
Amin did pursue an aggressive expansionist policy which 
certainly raised the level of threats to his neighbours - 
especially Tanzania but also Kenya, and potentially the Sudan. 
This resulted in increased war deterrent costs to both 
Tanzania and Kenya but not to militarisation, still less to 
military governments in either. It led also to border 
skirmishes and - in combination with the suspected disloyalty 
of key units - to the Kagera invasion, full scale war and the 
demise of the Amin regime. However, it would probably be a 
mistake to relate this pattern to General Amin's being a 
military man or his government a military one rather than to 
his own character, ambitions and style of governance. 
Nigeria's military governments, for example, have never shown 
any inclination to use their undoubted regional military 
superiority to resolve border disputes, even when offshore oil 
was potentially involved, or other political tensions.
Solidarity contingents for mutual defence are also not
particularly linked to military governments. The largest and 
best known cases within Africa are Tanzania and Zimbabwe to
Mozambique - a triad of civilian governments. The lesser 
Tanzanian cases (Seychelles, Comores) also involve civilian 
governments, albeit ones which came to power by force majeure. 
Nigeria's early retraining and interim security force to 
Tanzania was from the civilian government in Nigeria, and 
while the subsequent military governments have, in principle, 
been willing to supply solidarity contingents to Southern
Africa this has not in fact happened. Senegal's rescue of the 
elected Gambian government (in a multi-party competitive
election) from an attempted coup or insurrection also involves 
two civilian governments. The two exceptions are the despatch 
of the Libyan expeditionary forces to prop up the Amin regime 
and various factions in Chad which were between military 
reg imes.
This aside is not a general discussion of military rule in SSA 
as to causes, nature or effects. Rather it seeks to 
demonstrate that war and military government are not - at
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xeast in SSA - generally integrally related causally in either 
direction. As it happens, the Republic of South Africa would 
»-u a ^e.tter study of interactions in both directions even 
iOugh it does not - yet - have what could reasonably be 
escribed as a military government, despite a growing degree 
?- 111 ?'1ltar *sati°n of domestic and regional strategy and policy 
as wei. as of the decision-taking process.
A Note On Sources
A large part of this paper is constructed from a great number 
of fragmentary oral communications and newspaper articles 
heard or read over a span of 27 years. In the cases of 
Tanzania, Mozambique and the Southern African region more 
generally it results in part from first hand experience. None 
is based on official materials viewed as confidential by these 
governments.
Among the works with more substantial treatment of issues 
included in this study are:
Green, R. H. and X. Kadhani, 'Parameters As Warnings And 
Guideposts: The Case of Zimbabwe', Journal of
Development Studies, No. 15, United Nations, New 
York, 1985
Hanlon, J., Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in
Southern Africa, James Currey/Indiana University 
Press for CIIR, London/Bloomington, 1986
Martin, D. and P. Johnson, Desructive Engagement: Southern
Africa at War, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 
1986
Stoneman, C. (ed), Zimbabwe's Prospects: Issues of Race Class 
and State in Southern Africa, Macmillan, Basingstoke 
and Harare, 1988
UNICEF (by R. H. Green, D. Esrat, M. Mauras and R. Morgan), 
Children On The Front Line: the impact of apartheid, 
destabilisation and war on children in southern 
Africa, UNICEF, New York, 1987
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